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Article 2

Technology Assessment 2.0
REVAMPING OUR APPROACH TO EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES
*

Albert C. Lin†
INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of rapid and potentially revolutionary
technological changes. These changes will play a critical role in
addressing many of the problems facing human society.
Improvements in energy efficiency may reduce our dependence
on fossil fuels. Redesigned manufacturing processes may
require less energy and generate less waste. Geoengineering
projects may mitigate some of the effects of climate change.
And developments in synthetic biology and nanotechnology
may increase food production, generate new pharmaceuticals,
remediate environmental pollution, and transform countless
aspects of our lives.
At the same time, however, new technologies also raise the
specter of adverse health effects, environmental degradation and
disaster, and even dehumanization, should those technologies go
awry. As past experiences teach us, new technologies do not
merely solve old problems. Often, technologies create problems of
their own, many of which reveal themselves only with time.
Addressing these problems becomes especially difficult when
technological systems become entrenched.1 New technologies pose
*
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1
See DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 17-19 (1980)
(“[B]y the time a technology is sufficiently well developed and diffused for its unwanted
social consequences to become apparent, it is no longer easily controlled.”); RICHARD
SCLOVE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, REINVENTING TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT: A 21ST CENTURY MODEL 2-3 (2010), available at http://wilsoncenter.org/
topics/docs/ReinventingTechnologyAssessment1.pdf.
†
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a particularly high potential for unexpected effects.2 They also
have the potential to change cultural norms and social
relationships in unpredictable ways.3 German sociologist Ulrich
Beck succinctly characterized the connection between science and
risk in his book Risk Society, where he noted, “Science is one of the
causes [of risks], the medium of definition [of risks] and the source
of solutions to risks.”4
Given the transformative yet destabilizing potential of
new technologies, it is critical to maximize our understanding of
them and their effects—intended and unintended—as they are
developed, introduced, and disseminated. While it would be
naïve to think that we can fully predict the course of a
technology’s development and its consequences, ongoing and
methodical evaluation can help us to anticipate, avoid, manage,
and mitigate adverse effects. Merely carrying out more effective
technology assessment is not sufficient, however. Because of the
wide-ranging effects of technologies on society and individual
lives, the assessment of emerging technologies must be
broadened beyond technical experts to involve the general
public. This article identifies tools for carrying out more open,
effective, and encompassing technology management.
Part I begins with a brief introduction to several
technologies that will be among the most important and
controversial in the coming decades: biotechnology (including
synthetic biology), nanotechnology, and geoengineering. The
pervasive potential of these technologies warrants their
thorough consideration as well as increased public
participation in decision-making processes about them. As Part
II explains, tools such as technology assessment and
environmental impact assessment were developed in an
attempt to understand and predict the ramifications of new
technologies and to increase public involvement. For various
reasons, however, these efforts generally have not achieved
effective assessment or meaningful public participation,
leaving the forces of technological change seemingly
uncontrolled. Part III explores how we might better manage
technology and its consequences. One option simply involves
2

Noting the increasingly unpredictable consequences of new technologies,
David Owen has examined the possible implications for the requirement of
foreseeability in tort law. David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Law, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 569 (2010).
3
See COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 11, 16.
4
ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 155 (Mark
Ritter trans., Sage Publ’ns 1992).
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broader and more effective implementation of existing
management tools that we have never fully utilized, such as
technology assessment. Some efforts along these lines have
been initiated, but their ultimate impact remains uncertain.
More radical options, such as conducting national technology
referenda or requiring assurance bonds for technologies with
uncertain effects, are needed to bring about participatory and
effective management of emerging technologies.
I.

THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Broadly defined, technology includes the tools,
techniques, and knowledge that humans use to mediate their
environment. Technology and the environment are inherently
related, and emerging technologies, which are often incompletely
understood, pose a challenging conundrum to societies that seek
to reap their benefits while avoiding serious adverse harms.
A.

The Technologies of Tomorrow

This section briefly discusses some of the technologies
that are expected to have broad and revolutionary impacts on
human societies and the environment in the near future. The
goal here is not to provide a comprehensive account of these
fields, but rather to demonstrate that such technologies
warrant careful consideration and public deliberation.
1. Biotechnology
The term biotechnology, as used in this article, refers
both to conventional genetic engineering, in which existing
genetic material from one organism is transferred to another,
and to synthetic biology, in which researchers synthesize novel
genetic material coding for desired traits. Genetic engineering
is a well-established technology projected to expand into
numerous new applications in the coming years, whereas
synthetic biology is in a comparatively early stage of research
and development.5 The discussion below focuses on agricultural
biotechnology, which has proven particularly controversial.6
5

See Jim Haseloff & Jim Ajioka, Synthetic Biology: History, Challenges, and
Prospects, 6 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE S389 (2009), available at http://rsif.
royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2009/06/02/rsif.2009.0176.focus.full.pdf+html.
6
Other applications of genetic engineering include the manufacture of
synthetic insulin, human growth hormone, and other desired proteins for medical
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a. Genetic Engineering
Genetic engineering, the manipulation of existing
genetic material to produce desired traits in an organism, has
gained widespread use in crop modification over the past two
decades.7 Genetic engineering offers two major advantages over
traditional breeding techniques. Through the introduction of
transgenes—genetic material isolated from one organism and
transferred to another—genetic engineers can incorporate a
wider range of desired traits into a crop, including traits
originally found only in unrelated species.8 In addition, desired
traits can be incorporated into a crop far more quickly through
genetic engineering than through traditional crossbreeding.9 To
date, genetic engineers have focused primarily on incorporating
pesticidal traits or herbicide resistance into commodity crops.10
Genetically modified varieties have become widely prevalent
among major crops, accounting for 80% of corn, 92% of
soybeans, 86% of cotton, and 93% of canola planted in the
United States.11 Furthermore, an estimated 75% of processed
foods in U.S. grocery stores contain genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) of some sort.12 Now, genetic engineers are
turning their attention not only to improving crop traits such
as drought resistance and enhanced yields, but also to
developing plants and animals that will produce
pharmaceutical compounds and industrial chemicals.13
Notwithstanding the widespread presence of GMOs in
agriculture and in the food supply, critics have continued to
raise concerns about potential health and environmental
hazards associated with these crops. Health concerns generally
involve potential allergenicity and toxicity.14 Genes code for
treatment. See Alan McHughen, Learning from Mistakes: Missteps in Public
Acceptance Issues with GMOs, in WHAT CAN NANOTECHNOLOGY LEARN FROM
BIOTECHNOLOGY? 33, 39-40 (Kenneth David & Paul B. Thompson eds., 2008).
7
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-60, GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED CROPS 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See Gregory Jaffe, The Next Generation, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2009, at 38.
11
GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
12
Americans Clueless About Gene-Altered Foods, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 23,
2005, 6:13 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7277844.
13
See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 1; Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps,
Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically
Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2186-89 (2004).
14
Mandel, supra note 13, at 2190-94.
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proteins, which are potential food allergens, and thus the
transfer of genes from one plant to another may transfer
allergenic properties along with it.15 Toxic effects might arise
from pesticides produced by engineered crops,16 or from
inadvertent increases in naturally occurring toxins resulting
from genetic manipulation.17 Genetic modification of plants can
even lead to the creation of biological components that have not
previously existed in nature, possibly causing unexpected
allergenic or toxic effects.18 Environmental risks include the
potential for gene transfer and ecosystem disruption.19 Gene
transfer refers to the movement of transgenes through crosspollination or other means from an engineered crop to relatives
of that crop, including other varieties of that crop or a crop’s
wild relatives.20 The transfer of transgenes could disrupt
ecosystems in various ways. On the one hand, wild relatives
might demonstrate increased weediness and crowd out
competing species; on the other hand, a rare wild species may
become extinct as it interbreeds and hybridizes with
engineered crops.21 Other environmental hazards include the
establishment of wild populations of transgenic plants, and
mortality among nontarget, beneficial species that consume
crops engineered to contain pesticides.22 The development of
genetically modified plants that can produce drugs and
industrial chemicals may pose even more significant health
and environmental risks, as inedible and potentially harmful
15

Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706,
4728 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592); see also Dean D.
Metcalfe, What Are the Issues in Addressing the Allergenic Potential of Genetically
Modified Foods?, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1110, 1111 (2003) (noting that simply
avoiding the transfer of genes known to code for allergens does not solve the problem
because “the characteristics of a protein with known allergenicity that would
distinguish this protein from a protein unlikely to be allergenic are not known”).
16
See Joël Spiroux de Vendômois et al., A Comparison of the Effects of Three
GM Corn Varieties on Mammalian Health, 5 INT’L J. BIOLOGICAL SCI. 706 (2009)
(reporting signs of kidney and liver toxicity in rats that had been fed corn genetically
modified to synthesize Bt toxins used as insecticides).
17
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS 69-73 (2000).
18
Katharine A. Van Tassel, Genetically Modified Plants Used for Food, Risk
Assessment, and Uncertainty Principles: Does the Transition from Ignorance to
Indeterminacy Trigger the Need for Post-Market Surveillance?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 220, 230-37 (2009) (discussing recent discoveries indicating that genes function and
interrelate in much more complex ways than previously understood).
19
Mandel, supra note 13, at 2194-98.
20
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 67.
21
See id.
22
See id. at 70-71.
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substances are introduced into food crops.23 Genetically
modified animals raise further concerns, including the
potential for the transmission of new disease agents or for the
escape of transgenic animals that could outcompete wild
animal species and wreak havoc on ecosystems.24
GMOs have become commonplace in U.S. agriculture
and on American supermarket shelves despite surprisingly low
public awareness and support. Only about one-fourth of the
American public favors the introduction of GMOs into the food
supply, and most Americans believe—incorrectly—that they
have not ingested foods containing GMOs.25 Lax government
oversight enabled the spread of GMOs notwithstanding public
opposition and minimal consideration of health and
environmental risks. GMOs are loosely governed under the
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology
(“Framework”),26 established by the federal government in 1986
with the ostensible purpose of regulating health and
environmental risks that might result from the development,
commercialization, and consumption of GMOs.27 A principal
motivation behind the policy, however, was to “minimize the
uncertainties and inefficiencies that [could] stifle innovation
and impair the competitiveness” of the nascent biotechnology
industry.28 Indeed, although the Framework is described as a
“comprehensive federal regulatory policy,”29 it is better
understood as a patchwork of existing laws pieced together to
deflect calls for new legislation specifically addressing GMOs.
The Framework identifies three primary agencies with
authority under preexisting laws to regulate risks that
biotechnology products might pose: the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, which monitors for plant-pest risks;
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which regulates
pesticidal substances; and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), which regulates the safety and labeling of foods. Under
23

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC
PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION 15, 68 (2002).
24
Mandel, supra note 13, at 2200-02.
25
See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 1 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2008, at
7-36 (2008) (summarizing findings of surveys conducted by Pew Initiative on Food and
Biotechnology).
26
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter Framework].
27
Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49
Fed. Reg. 50,856, 50,856-57 (Dec. 31, 1984).
28
Id. at 50,857.
29
Framework, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302.
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the Framework, the agencies are directed to focus on the
characteristics of the biotechnology product at issue—not the
fact that a product was genetically engineered—and to regulate
only those risks they deem unreasonable.30 The Framework
does not require, however, comprehensive analyses of the
health and environmental effects of individual GMOs or
systematic consideration of the overall desirability of GMOs for
society. In addition, the ad hoc nature of the Framework leaves
significant regulatory gaps with respect to potential health and
environmental risks.31
The FDA’s regulation of GMOs in food exemplifies the
piecemeal and relatively narrow scope of oversight under the
Framework. The FDA’s authority with respect to GMOs derives
from its more general authority over adulterated foods,
including foods containing additives that are unsafe.32
Accordingly, the FDA views its jurisdiction over GMOs as
limited to genetically modified (GM) foods or food products.33 GM
plants used to produce industrial chemicals, for example, receive
no FDA review, and the FDA does not concern itself with
environmental risks associated with the growing of GM crops.34
Although food additives by and large must be approved
by the FDA before use, a substance added to food is exempt if it
is generally recognized as safe (GRAS).35 A genetic modification
may create a substance that is considered a food additive.
30

Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority:
Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg.
6753, 6756 (Feb. 27, 1992).
31
For detailed discussions and critiques of GMO oversight, see Mary Jane
Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology Model for Regulating
the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
93, 112-41 (2007), and Mandel, supra note 13, at 2221-42.
32
21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2)(C), 348 (2006). The term adulterated food also
includes “any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to
health,” id. § 342(a)(1), and the FDA has affirmed its authority to regulate GM foods
containing toxicants through this provision. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from
New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,990 (May 29, 1992).
33
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 22,989-90.
34
See Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to
Regulating Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 408 n.70
(2007). The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is charged with assessing the
environmental risks of growing GM crops, but its analyses, which focus on plant-pest
risks, are seen as inadequate. Angelo, supra note 31, at 137.
35
21 U.S.C. § 348 (2006). Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a
food additive is defined as “any substance the intended use of which results . . . in its
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food . . . if such
substance is not generally recognized . . . to be safe under the conditions of its intended
use.” Id. § 321(s).
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Under the FDA’s policy on GM foods, however, most GM foods
require no premarket approval or special labeling.36 The policy,
which provides that GM foods are to be treated no differently for
regulatory purposes than foods developed through traditional
plant breeding, presumes that most substances added to foods
via genetic modification are GRAS because they “will be the
same as or substantially similar to substances commonly found
in food . . . .”37 As commentators have pointed out, the minimal
oversight under the policy is further diluted by its self-policing
nature: producers of new plant varieties make the GRAS
determinations themselves.38 In fact, producers are not even
required to report their GRAS determinations to the FDA,
although they may do so of their own volition.39 The discretionary
judgment involved in making and reporting GRAS determinations
essentially makes the FDA’s regulatory scheme a voluntary one
and reflects the Framework’s hands-off approach.
b. Synthetic Biology
The emerging field of synthetic biology builds on the
techniques of conventional genetic engineering and hints at
both a wider array of uses as well as more disturbing risks.
Synthetic biology involves the synthesis of organic molecules
not found in nature, with the aim of creating artificial living
systems or of facilitating the assembly of living systems based
on interchangeable genetic sequences.40 Unlike conventional
genetic engineering, which relies on genetic material from
existing organisms, synthetic biology entails the design of novel
genetic sequences and even entire genomes.41 Synthetic biology
36

Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at
22,985; id. at 22,991 (declining to require disclosure of presence of GMOs in food labeling).
37
Id. at 22,985.
38
See Angelo, supra note 31, at 133; Mandel, supra note 13, at 2219.
39
21 C.F.R. § 170.35 (2010) (setting out procedure for voluntarily obtaining
FDA affirmation of GRAS status); Substances Generally Recognized as Safe, 62 Fed.
Reg. 18,938, 18,941 (Apr. 17, 1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 170, 184, 186, 570)
(“[A] manufacturer may market a substance that the manufacturer determines is
GRAS without informing the agency.”); Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New
Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,989.
40
See Steven A. Benner & A. Michael Sismour, Synthetic Biology, 6 NATURE
REVS. 533, 533 (2005); see also Paras Chopra & Akhil Kamma, Engineering Life
Through Synthetic Biology, 6 IN SILICO BIOLOGY 401, 403 (2006) (“[W]e define
Synthetic Biology as a field involving synthesis of novel biological systems which are
not generally found in nature.”); Haseloff & Ajioka, supra note 5, at 1 (“Synthetic
biology . . . seeks to employ engineering principles to reprogramme living systems.”).
41
See Philip Ball, Starting from Scratch, 431 NATURE 624, 625 (2004).
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is at an early stage of development, with most research
involving biological materials isolated from cells within
laboratory settings.42 Scientists, however, are in the process of
establishing standards for assembling DNA-based biological
circuits and a legal framework for sharing standardized parts.43
The ability to design new biological materials and
chemicals through synthetic biology is expected to lead to the
development of new drugs, drug delivery systems, biofuels,
biosensors, and microbes that can digest wastes and
environmental toxins.44 But synthesized forms of life also could
have unpredictable effects if they are released or escape into
the environment, and synthetic biology could even be deployed
for nefarious purposes by bioterrorists.45 Such concerns are
magnified by the possibility that synthetic biology experiments
could become quite easy to conduct. The fear is that relatively
untrained people may someday be able to use widely available
materials to assemble their own custom-built life forms.46
In a recent survey, researchers found that the large
majority of the general public is in favor of greater public
disclosure and government regulation of synthetic biology
research.47 No regulations specific to synthetic biology, however,
are yet in place.48 Rather, synthetic biology processes and
42

See id. at 626; W. Wayt Gibbs, Synthetic Life, SCI. AM., May 2004, at 75, 81.
See Haseloff & Ajioka, supra note 5, at 1; Jon Mooallem, Do-It-Yourself
Genetic Engineering, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010 (Magazine), at 40 (describing efforts to
build an open-source genetic library containing more than 5000 BioBricks).
44
See Ball, supra note 41, at 625; Gibbs, supra note 42, at 75, 81; Steven
Yearley, The Ethical Landscape: Identifying the Right Way to Think About the Ethical
and Societal Aspects of Synthetic Biology Research and Products, 6 J. ROYAL SOC’Y
INTERFACE S559 (2009), available at http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/
2009/05/12/rsif.2009.0055.focus.full.pdf+html.
45
See Yearley, supra note 44, at 3.
46
See id. at 2 (comparing potential for informal experiments in synthetic
biology to breakthroughs in information technology initiated in garages and other
informal settings); Gibbs, supra note 42, at 81 (noting ease of access to information and
synthetic DNA); Mooallem, supra note 43, at 40 (noting some synthetic biologists’ goal
of enabling “the most sophisticated custom-built life forms [to] be assembled from a
catalog of standardized parts”).
47
See HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., NANOTECHNOLOGY, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, &
PUBLIC OPINION 16 (2009), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/
files/8286/nano_synbio.pdf (reporting that 90% of respondents believed that “more
should be done to inform the public about this research” and that 66% of respondents
agreed that the “federal government should regulate this research”).
48
See MICHAEL RODEMEYER, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
NEW LIFE, OLD BOTTLES: REGULATING FIRST-GENERATION PRODUCTS OF SYNTHETIC
BIOLOGY 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6319/
nano_synbio2_electronic_final.pdf (noting that scientists have started to raise concerns
about risks of synthetic biology research).
43
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products are likely to be governed by the same haphazard
scheme that applies to conventional genetic engineering.49
2. Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology, the science of manipulating matter at
the nanometer scale,50 is an emerging suite of technologies with
an even broader, more mind-boggling array of potential
applications than genetic engineering. Hailed by some as the
foundation for the “next industrial revolution,” nanotechnology
offers the promise of precise manufacturing methods that are
cleaner and more efficient than the relatively crude, top-down
methods that dominate industrial processes today.51
Nanomaterials are already being used in medical diagnosis and
treatment, cosmetics, sunscreens, stain-resistant clothing,
paints and coatings, electronics, tires, tennis rackets, and
foods. In addition to these existing applications, researchers
also expect to produce new materials that can be used as drug
delivery devices and chemical catalysts or incorporated into
self-cleaning surfaces and other products.52 With widespread
commercialization on the near horizon, regulators are just
beginning to grapple with the question of how to respond to
nanotechnology’s potential health and environmental effects.
Developing an approach for safe management of
nanotechnology without unduly impeding innovation presents
a daunting challenge. The health and environmental risks of
nanotechnology are highly uncertain. Materials produced via
nanotechnology are of interest because they often behave very
differently from the conventional materials from which they are
49

See id. at 29-45 (reviewing potential applicability of existing laws and
guidelines to synthetic biology); id. at 9 (characterizing new legislation specific to
synthetic biology as “an unlikely option”).
50
THE ROYAL SOC’Y & THE ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG’G, NANOSCIENCE AND
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES 5 (2004) [hereinafter ROYAL
SOC’Y REPORT], available at http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm.
51
See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, National
Nanotechnology Initiative: Leading to the Next Industrial Revolution (Jan. 21, 2000),
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/20000121_4.html; see also Barbara Karn,
Overview of Environmental Applications and Implications, in NANOTECHNOLOGY AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 2, 3 (Barbara Karn et al. eds., 2005). Top-down manufacturing
involves the processing of a larger sample of raw material into a smaller item for use,
whereas bottom-up methods build things on an atom-by-atom or molecule-by-molecule
basis. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three
Futures, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 179, 181 (2003).
52
Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 349, 353-54 (2007).
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derived. Their small size, chemical composition, surface
structure, solubility, shape, and aggregative tendencies also may
make them particularly detrimental when taken into the body.53
Nonetheless, health and environmental effects of exposure to
nanomaterials have not been extensively studied, and the
expected proliferation of nanotechnology materials and
applications complicates efforts to draw generalizations
regarding any such effects.54 Future advances in nanotechnology
could incorporate self-replicating capacities—that is, processing
and fabrication mechanisms that would enable nanomachines to
reproduce themselves in a process akin to cell division—and may
pose even greater and more unpredictable threats.55
According to one estimate, over one thousand
nanotechnology consumer products have now been brought to
market,56 yet most Americans remain unfamiliar with
nanotechnology.57 Once people are given basic information
about it, they tend to form positive impressions and to expect
that its benefits will outweigh its risks.58 Nonetheless, surveys
also suggest serious public concerns about unknown effects and
53

See, e.g., ROYAL SOC’Y REPORT, supra note 50, at 41-42; Andre Nel et al.,
Toxic Potential of Materials at the Nanolevel, 311 SCIENCE 622 (2006); Günter
Oberdörster et al., Nanotoxicology: An Emerging Discipline Evolving from Studies of
Ultrafine Particles, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 823, 824 (2005); Craig A. Poland et al.,
Carbon Nanotubes Introduced into the Abdominal Cavity of Mice Show Asbestos-Like
Pathogenicity in a Pilot Study, 3 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 423 (2008); Benedicte
Trouiller et al., Titanium Dioxide Nanoparticles Induce DNA Damage and Genetic
Instability In Vivo in Mice, 69 CANCER RESEARCH 8784 (2009) (finding systemic genetic
damage in mice exposed to titanium dioxide nanoparticles—which are widely used in
cosmetics, sunscreen, and paint).
54
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 620/K-09/011, NANOMATERIAL RESEARCH
STRATEGY 11, 20-21 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/nanoscience (listed in
“Resources” menu on right-hand side) (discussing issues to be researched); Lin, supra
note 52, at 357-58.
55
See Lin, supra note 52, at 355.
56
Analysis, PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, http://www.
nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/analysis_draft (last visited Jan. 19, 2011)
(“As of August 25, 2009, the nanotechnology consumer products inventory contains
1015 products or product lines.”).
57
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 25, at 7-38; DAN M. KAHAN ET AL.,
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, NANOTECHNOLOGY RISK PERCEPTIONS:
THE INFLUENCE OF AFFECT AND VALUES 2 (2007), available at http://www.
nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/2710/164_nanotechriskperceptions_dankahan.p
df (reporting that 81% of survey respondents had heard “nothing at all” or “just a little”
about nanotechnology prior to survey).
58
See JANE MACOUBRIE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, INFORMED
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 8 (2005), available
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Nanotechnologies/
Nanotech_0905.pdf. Subsequent research suggests that reactions to nanotechnology
depend in large part on a person’s underlying values. See KAHAN ET AL., supra note 57,
at 1-2, 5.
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potential health risks.59 Participants in various studies have
expressed not only a desire for information about such risks,
but also a desire to be involved in decision making regarding
nanotechnology development.60
Despite public unease, nanotechnology remains largely
unregulated. The EPA has the authority to regulate chemical
substances under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
However, the agency has taken the position that the molecular
identity of a substance, and not particle size, is critical to
determining whether a nanoscale substance is a new material
subject to the new chemical reporting requirements found in
section 5 of TSCA.61 Thus, even though a nanoscale substance
“may differ in certain physical and/or chemical properties
resulting from the difference in particle size, the EPA considers
the two forms to be the same chemical substance because they
have the same molecular identity.”62 The EPA does possess
authority under section 6 of TSCA to regulate substances
classified as “existing” rather than “new.”63 That provision,
however, places such heavy evidentiary burdens on the EPA
that it is unlikely to be applied to nanoscale substances.64 The
EPA has expressed its intent to develop rules under TSCA to
gather information on nanomaterial production, use, and
exposure and to develop health and safety data.65 Yet regulators
face daunting challenges in terms of the present lack of such
data and the expanding universe of nanoscale substances found
in research labs and the marketplace.66

59

See MACOUBRIE, supra note 58, at 10.
See id. at 3-4, 14; PATRICK HAMLETT ET AL., NATIONAL CITIZENS’
TECHNOLOGY FORUM: NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 2 (2008),
available at http://cns.asu.edu/cns-library/type/?action=getfile&file=88&section=lib.
61
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TSCA INVENTORY STATUS OF NANOSCALE
SUBSTANCES—GENERAL APPROACH 2 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/
nano/nmsp-inventorypaper2008.pdf. Certain classes of nanoscale substances, such as
pesticides containing nanomaterials, may be subject to regulation under narrower
statutes, including the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
See Lynn L. Bergeson, FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel Considers Nanosilver, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. 11, 143-44 (2009); Lin, supra note 52, at 371-74.
62
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 61, at 6.
63
15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006).
64
See J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION NANOTECHNOLOGY 21 (2009), available at
http://207.58.186.238/process/assets/files/7316/pen-18.pdf; Lin, supra note 52, at 362-67
(discussing difficulties in applying TSCA).
65
Sixty-Fourth Report of the TSCA Interagency Testing Committee to the
Administrator of the EPA, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,878, 38,880 (Aug. 4, 2009).
66
See Lin, supra note 52, at 357-61.
60
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3. Geoengineering
Geoengineering refers to proposed planetary-scale
techniques to limit or avoid the consequences of higher
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the Earth’s
atmosphere.67 These techniques include the release of aerosols
into the stratosphere to block a substantial fraction of the sun’s
radiation and the mass fertilization of the oceans to increase
the uptake of carbon by phytoplankton.68 The term usually does
not encompass techniques for reducing GHG emissions or
capturing such emissions before they are released into the
environment (such as carbon capture and sequestration), nor is
it typically applied to tree-planting and other efforts to enhance
terrestrial carbon sinks.69 Unlike these more conventional
approaches, geoengineering proposals are highly controversial
because of the grave risks and uncertainties involved, as well as
the grand scale of any contemplated operations to deliberately
alter the Earth’s climate system. Geoengineering efforts could
have unexpected effects on precipitation patterns, atmospheric
quality, and ecosystems, and such efforts would not necessarily
address all the effects of increased GHG concentrations.70
Although reducing GHG emissions is widely recognized
as the preferred means of responding to climate change,
geoengineering has attracted growing attention as a possible
emergency or complementary response, given the difficulties,
complexities, and costs involved in reducing emissions
directly.71 At present, no full-scale geoengineering projects have
been undertaken, and research efforts have primarily involved
computer modeling rather than field testing.72 Yet even
experimentation with geoengineering techniques could create a
67

See Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering Governance, 8 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
1, 2 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/vol8/iss3/art2.
68
Id. at 3-7.
69
David W. Keith, Geoengineering, 409 NATURE 420, 420 (2001).
70
Lin, supra note 67, at 4-6. The release of aerosols to block some of the sun’s
radiation, for instance, would do nothing to counter the increasing acidity of the oceans
caused by higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
71
See, e.g., Alan Carlin, Why a Different Approach Is Required If Global
Climate Change Is to Be Controlled Efficiently or Even at All, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y REV. 685, 706-07 (2008); P.J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric
Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE
211, 217 (2006) (expressing preference for emissions reductions, but suggesting that
alternative responses be researched).
72
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A
COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD FOCUS FEDERAL GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND
INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 13-15 (2010).
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moral hazard that would undermine emissions-reduction
efforts and could foster the growth of interest groups that
would have strong incentives to advocate for geoengineering
projects.73 Because such experiments may affect millions of
people—if not every person on Earth—experimentation on even
a modest scale would demand some form of informed consent.74
No international treaty directly governs geoengineering at this
time.75 Ideally, if a full-blown geoengineering project were
carried out, it would take place as a cooperative effort following
a consensual decision-making process by the international
community. The logistics and costs of some geoengineering
techniques, however, are such that a single nation—or even a
wealthy individual—could undertake a geoengineering project
on its own.76 Finding ways to manage the uncertainties raised
by various geoengineering techniques while accounting for
ethical concerns poses yet another daunting technology
challenge for society.
B.

Goals in Technology Management
1. Assessment

Because emerging technologies can drastically
transform society and the environment, such technologies
should be carefully assessed and subjected to public input.
Technological change does not occur on its own. Technology
management is possible because technologies are a product of
human discovery, choice, and policy. This is not to suggest,
however, that society can exert complete control over
technologies and their effects. Even technologies that are
subject to close scrutiny before and during implementation can
give rise to unanticipated consequences. Once introduced,
technologies enter into a dynamic relationship with societies
that shapes and transforms societies themselves.77 Accordingly,
the formative and continuing influence of technologies on
73

David R. Morrow et al., Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for Climate
Engineering Research, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 45,106, § 3 (2009).
74
See id. at 4-5 (discussing principle of respect for individual autonomy as
basis for requirement to obtain consent for geoengineering experiments).
75
See Daniel Bodansky, May We Engineer the Climate?, 33 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 309, 311-16 (1996).
76
See Lin, supra note 67, at 12.
77
See COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing “the dilemma of control”
of technology).
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humans and the environment generates a need for robust
mechanisms to predict, evaluate, and govern their development.
This is especially so in light of the often irreversible and global
nature of the hazards associated with modern technologies.78
The practice of technology assessment came into being
in the 1970s with the ambition of analyzing the full range of
consequences—social, environmental, and otherwise—that a
technology may have.79 Technology assessment was to involve
objective analysis drawing on the natural and social sciences;
subjective value judgments were to be left to democratically
elected officials.80 A fundamental premise underlying technology
assessment was that through the application of comprehensive
rationality, society could effectively manage—if not solve—many
of its problems.81 Although this faith in rational analysis and
control was overly optimistic, the underlying motivation—to
develop and manage technologies in a more deliberate manner—
remains critical. In recent years, refinements to technology
assessment have sought ways to incorporate public values into
the assessment process and to encourage greater self-reflection
within the scientific community.82
Risk assessment is a central component of technology
assessment.83 Risk assessment seeks to produce quantitative
estimates of the probability and magnitude of potential harms
from an activity or occurrence—such as the adoption of a new
technology—based on available data.84 The risk assessment
process generates a risk characterization, which ideally includes a
range of estimates to quantify identified hazards, as well as a
discussion of the degree of confidence with which estimates are
made, uncertainties in the analysis, and underlying assumptions.85
78

Cf. BECK, supra note 4, at 21-23 (describing distinct characteristics of
modern risks).
79
See Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth
Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 621-22
(1973); see also RON WESTRUM, TECHNOLOGIES & SOCIETY: THE SHAPING OF PEOPLE
AND THINGS 325 (1991) (defining technology assessment as “an attempt to predict what
the effects of a technology will be if it is implemented”).
80
See Norman J. Vig & Herbert Paschen, Technology Assessment in
Comparative Perspective, in PARLIAMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN EUROPE 3, 8 (Norman J. Vig & Herbert Paschen eds., 2000).
81
See Tribe, supra note 79, at 622.
82
See infra Part III.
83
See Frank Fischer, Are Scientists Irrational? Risk Assessment in Practical
Reason, in SCIENCE AND CITIZENS: GLOBALIZATION & THE CHALLENGE OF ENGAGEMENT
54, 54 (Melissa Leach et al. eds., 2005).
84
See HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 395 (5th ed. 2008).
85
See id. at 398.
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Technology assessment can involve other predictive techniques in
addition to risk assessment, such as mathematical modeling,
technological forecasting, and scenario building.86
These technical analyses, of course, cannot provide all
the data necessary to make perfectly informed decisions. Even
the relatively well-developed practice of risk assessment has
significant limitations. Although risk assessment can identify
some hazards as well as options for coping with them,87 risk
quantification often involves rough probability estimates whose
confidence intervals may vary by a degree of magnitude or
more.88 There are some hazards, moreover, that simply cannot be
quantified because of insufficient data or the inability to perform
useful experiments.89 And beyond that, there are other hazards—
“unknown unknowns”—that cannot be identified because of
limitations in understanding, stochastic processes, and the
inherent unpredictability of interactions between society and
technology.90 Decisions regarding technology must take these
uncertainties into account, even if they cannot be well articulated.
These points lead to a more fundamental criticism of
risk assessment. The quantitative analyses fostered by risk
assessments tend to crowd out from debate qualitative factors
and other pertinent considerations that are less amenable to
scientific characterization.91 In other words, the “technical
rationality” of risk assessment, which focuses on scientific
measurement, can differ quite dramatically from the “cultural

86

See WESTRUM, supra note 79, at 328-29.
See E. J. Woodhouse, Toward More Usable Technology Policy Analyses, in
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS: POLICY ANALYSIS IN CONGRESS 13, 16 (Gary C.
Bryner ed., 1992).
88
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT
165-66 (1994) (criticizing overreliance on “artificially precise single estimates of risk”).
89
Id. at 165 (discussing sources of uncertainty); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying
Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897, 968-69.
90
Elizabeth Fisher et al., Understanding Environmental Models in Their
Legal and Regulatory Context, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 251, 271-72 (2010) (“[I]rreducible
ignorance about a complex system will always be an inherent feature of modeling.”);
Helena Valve & Jussi Kauppila, Enacting Closure in the Environmental Control of
Genetically Modified Organisms, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 339, 353 (2008).
91
See BECK, supra note 4, at 71 (criticizing assumption of scientific rationality
“that so long as risks are not recognized scientifically, they do not exist—at least not
legally, medically, technologically, or socially, and they are thus not prevented, treated or
compensated for”); SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 265 (2005) (“In the United States, a preferred method
for displaying objectivity in public decisions has been to clothe the reasons for allocative
choices as far as possible in the language of numbers.”).
87
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rationality” often reflected in the attitudes of nonscientists.92
Cultural rationality considers not only quantifiable effects in
the decision-making process, but also contextual factors such
as personal experience and social values.93 While thorough
technical analysis is important to sound technology
management, finding ways to incorporate social values and
other concerns is critical as well.
2. Public Participation
In its conventional form, technology assessment
assumed a linear model of technology development in which
basic research is followed by applied research and then
production. Technology assessment focused on objective
analysis of virtually finished technologies and did little to
involve the public or to account for the values that society
holds. Technology assessors, in other words, were in charge of
providing technical knowledge, leaving the judgments and
decisions based on that knowledge to others.94
Public participation in technology management is
essential as a matter of democratic governance and as a means
of informing substantive choices with public values.95 Because
technology shapes both society as a whole and the lives of each
individual, the public must have a meaningful role in
technology management, including technology assessment, as a
matter of basic autonomy.96 Under the traditional liberal view
92

See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 7-9 (1982);
Fischer, supra note 83, at 55; Alonzo Plough & Sheldon Krimsky, The Emergence of
Risk Communication Studies: Social and Political Context, 12 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN
VALUES, Summer/Fall 1987, at 4, 8-9.
93
Fischer, supra note 83, at 55; Plough & Krimsky, supra note 92, at 8-9.
94
See MARK B. BROWN, SCIENCE IN DEMOCRACY: EXPERTISE, INSTITUTIONS,
AND REPRESENTATION 86 (2009) (discussing approaches “in which experts determine
the means of politics and citizens choose the ends” or that make “a parallel distinction
between technical knowledge and political judgment”); see also Tribe, supra note 79, at
657-59 (discussing potential for “our technological choices [to] define what we become”).
95
See Andy Stirling, Opening Up or Closing Down? Analysis, Participation
and Power in the Social Appraisal of Technology, in SCIENCE AND CITIZENS:
GLOBALIZATION & THE CHALLENGE OF ENGAGEMENT, supra note 83, at 218, 220
(discussing rationales for public participation in science and technology matters).
96
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 115, 117 (1995) (arguing for right of public participation in
risk assessments because they have consequences for public welfare). As Andy Stirling
has pointed out, the narrow involvement and “opaque technical procedures associated
with expert analysis . . . conflict with Habermasian principles of ‘ideal speech’ [and]
with Rawlsian notions of ‘public reason.’” Stirling, supra note 95, at 221. See generally
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOL. 1: REASON AND THE
ON THE
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of democratic processes, citizens hold natural rights, including
a right of liberty and a right against excessive government
control.97 Public participation in technology development,
assessment, and management is rooted in the protection and
expression of these rights and derives support from general
normative principles of social justice, democratic emancipation,
and equality.98 The contemporary democratic notions of public
reason and ideal speech reflect the principle that policy makers
should engage as broad an array of societal interests as
possible.99 Such engagement seeks to ensure that policy
decisions affecting society as a whole—including those
decisions regarding new technologies—are not reduced to the
agenda of dominant political and economic institutions or a
small group of elites. Greater public participation in such
decisions reflects a commitment to the empowerment of
citizens, no matter how ideologically or economically
marginalized they might be.100
Integrating public participation into decisions about
technology is also critical because public values anchor relevant
societal preferences about technology in terms of tolerance for
risk and uncertainty, desire for change, and willingness to
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 25 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984); John Rawls, The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
97
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-81 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1689) (discussing how assertion of negative rights
brings with it protection from government intervention and an opportunity for
individuals to assert private interests, which aggregate to inform the political will and
impact administrative institutions).
98
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL
ESSAYS 62-69, 76, 110-18 (Max Pensky ed. & trans., MIT Press 2001) (1998) (contrasting
liberal and conservative notions of democratic politics and the effects of globalization, and
providing normative justifications for public participation in decision making).
99
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 86, 98101, 363-73 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Polity 1987) (1984) (discussing an “ideal speech
situation” in which every competent actor has a right to participate in societal
discourse and is permitted to introduce any assertion into that discourse without
hindrance or coercion); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 7, 9, 214-20 (1996)
(propounding “public reason” as an ideal mode of deliberation for issues of public concern
in a pluralist society, and contending that an “overlapping consensus” can be reached
through recognition of a core set of substantive moral principles common to a
“reasonable” fragment of society). See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS
17-24, 95-111 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (advocating a universal
pragmatism requiring preacknowledgment among participants that the existence of an
ideal speech situation is possible, and that participants engaged in competent discourse
can reach a consensus that is representative of the general will of the public).
100
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 106-14 (1971) (arguing that “fair
and equal opportunity” requires that positions of influence be distributed based on
merit and that all persons have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills upon
which merits are assessed).
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make tradeoffs. In theory, decisions by elected officials in a
representative democracy can reflect public values and
concerns. Indeed, the assumption that political representatives
possess a particular competence to make decisions that are in
the public interest and consistent with public values is
foundational to the liberal theory of representative
government.101 With respect to technology matters, however,
representation of the public is often inadequate. Factors that
systematically bias the lawmaking process against focusing on
the potential risks of new technologies include the pressures on
politicians to respond to current headlines and regular election
cycles rather than on issues with distant time horizons, such as
the health or environmental consequences of emerging
technologies;102 the specialized body of knowledge necessary to
understand science and technology issues—a knowledge that
few legislators possess;103 and the substantial uncertainty
surrounding health and environmental risks, which generally
leads to inaction rather than the adoption of precautionary
measures.104 In addition, public choice theory predicts that
legislatures will cater to the interests of an organized and vocal
minority at the expense of a majority whose interests are more
diffuse.105 This dynamic is especially pronounced with emerging
technologies, which tend to have vigorous corporate or
institutional advocates but little opposition from a public
largely unaware of a technology or its potential risks.106 These
101

See BROWN, supra note 94, at 78-85; THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 320
(James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (noting “how salutary will be the interference
of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check” the potential for
misguided and rash decisions by the general public).
102
See Gary C. Bryner, Science, Technology, and Policy Analysis in Congress:
An Introduction, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS, supra note 87, at 3, 6; L.
Christopher Plein & David J. Webber, The Role of Technology Assessment in
Congressional Consideration of Biotechnology, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
POLITICS, supra note 87, at 123, 147.
103
See M. Granger Morgan & Jon M. Peha, Analysis, Governance, and the
Need for Better Institutional Arrangements, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR
CONGRESS 3, 11 (M. Granger Morgan & Jon M. Peha eds., 2003); Michael Rodemeyer, Back to
the Future: Revisiting OTA Ten Years Later, in MICHAEL RODEMEYER ET AL., WOODROW
WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 3 (2005),
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/techassessment.pdf.
104
See Lin, supra note 89, at 898-99.
105
Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Foreword: Post-Public Choice?,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 267, 268 (2002).
106
See ALLAN SCHNAIBERG, THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM SURPLUS TO SCARCITY
131 (1980) (contending that “[i]n the absence of a public sector debate over ‘science
policy,’ piecemeal decisions made in the U.S. continuously supported an exponential
increase in energy-intensive production” and in production of synthetic and novel
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obstacles to the expression of public values through ordinary
channels of representation are an important justification for
more direct public participation in technology matters.
When the government does attend to the hazards of
emerging technologies, the empirical techniques of risk
assessment and risk-benefit analysis often dominate its policies
to the detriment of public preferences.107 Technically, risk
management—the values-driven, policy-making process of
deciding how to respond to risk data—can be distinguished
from risk assessment—the expert-driven process of identifying,
analyzing, and quantifying risks.108 Notwithstanding this
distinction, risk managers often defer to the quantitative data
of risk assessment (or the lack of such data) in deciding how to
respond to the hazards posed by new technologies.109 Because
empirical techniques fail to account for all of the factors
relevant to social decision making, however, an approach
centered on quantifiable risks elides difficult, values-based
choices under a veneer of objectivity. Indeed, the act of
engaging in the discourse of risk through the risk management
process reinforces the sometimes dubious assumption that risk
can be understood, measured, and managed effectively.110
Moreover, although risk assessment is often characterized
as a purely scientific, values-free undertaking, the values of
those performing a risk assessment necessarily influence the
assumptions made, inferences drawn, and calculations performed
in an assessment.111 Questions regarding how to deal with the
uncertainty inherent in risk assessment are questions of policy,
chemicals). The widespread adoption of GMOs despite public opposition or ignorance
illustrates this tendency. See supra Part I.A.1.a.
107
See Fischer, supra note 83, at 54; Brian Wynne, Risk and Environment as
Legitimatory Discourses of Technology: Reflexivity Inside Out?, 50 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY
459, 460 (2002) (“Risk has become the form of public discourse through which public
meaning is given to technology and innovation . . . .”).
108
See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 84, at 395-99.
109
See Melissa Leach & Ian Scoones, Science and Citizenship in Global
Context, in SCIENCE AND CITIZENS, supra note 83 at 15, 22 (“Liberal understandings of
citizenship . . . hold faith in the modern state’s expertise [and] defer decisions to elected
elites, who historically have been highly reliant on accredited scientific and
technocratic expertise.”).
110
See Wynne, supra note 107, at 468-69; see also Baruch Fischhoff, Public
Values in Risk Research, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 75, 77 (1996)
(describing origins of risk research in industry efforts to manage internal affairs and
suggesting that risk analysis continues to “address[] the problems and speak[] the
language of industry”).
111
Shrader-Frechette, supra note 96, at 116; see also BECK, supra note 4, at 29
(“[O]ne must assume an ethical point of view in order to discuss risks meaningfully at
all.”); Paul Slovic, The Risk Game, 86 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 17, 19-22 (2001).

2011]

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 2.0

1329

not of science.112 Emerging technologies tend to involve highly
uncertain consequences.113 When decisions must be made in the
face of uncertainty, reliance on beliefs, values, and experiences
is rational and appropriate.114 Incorporating greater public
participation and discourse into technology assessment,
including risk assessment, is essential for this reason. Lay
citizens may have limited knowledge on technical matters,115
but nonetheless, they can dialogue effectively with experts and
play an important role in bringing public values into the
technology assessment process.116 Ultimately, rational debate
involving citizens, experts, and other interested parties can
lead to an expansion of relevant considerations or to the
development of consensus regarding the common good.117
In sum, technology assessment, once characterized as
the exclusive province of experts, can and should be opened up
to public participation. Part III.B considers ways of doing so in
greater detail. This broader and more open assessment process
should occur during rather than after technology development,
bringing public concerns into research decisions and technology
design.118 Ongoing public participation can make the decision

112

Shrader-Frechette, supra note 96, at 117; see also Stirling, supra note 95,
at 224 (noting that “probability theory underlies the entire activity of risk assessment,
yet its applicability is seriously constrained by recognition of intractable states of
uncertainty, indeterminacy and ignorance”).
113
COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing the broad and
unexpected consequences of the popularization of the automobile).
114
LARS KLÜVER ET AL., EUROPEAN PARTICIPATORY TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
173 (2000), available at http://www.tekno.dk/pdf/projekter/europta_Report.pdf (observing
that “the inequalities and uncertainties attached to scientific-technological
developments . . . call[] for more inclusive social policy analysis and decision-making”);
Fischer, supra note 83, at 59 (“As the move to basic cultural orientations is in significant
part a response to the fact that science cannot supply the needed answers, it is thus
anything but irrational.”); Shrader-Frechette, supra note 96, at 117 (discussing reasons
supporting the public’s right to participate in risk assessments).
115
Laypersons nevertheless can contribute greater breadth and depth of
knowledge to objective assessments. See Stirling, supra note 95, at 222.
116
BROWN, supra note 94, at 233-34 (contending that laypersons possess a
range of experiences and knowledge, as well as an ability to become knowledgeable
through deliberation); Daniel Lee Kleinman, Beyond the Science Wars: Contemplating
the Democratization of Science, 17 POLITICS & LIFE SCI. 133, 139 (1998) (discussing
examples of informed participation by laypersons in scientific and technical dialogues).
117
See HABERMAS, supra note 96, at 25; Leach & Scoones, supra note 109, at
24. Care must be taken in the design of participatory processes, however, to guard
against the potential for simply reinforcing existing power relations. See Leach &
Scoones, supra note 109, at 25; Stirling, supra note 95, at 225-26 (discussing framing
effects on technical analyses and participatory deliberation).
118
See Frank Fischer, Technological Deliberation in a Democratic Society: The
Case for Participatory Inquiry, 26 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 294, 297 (1999).
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process more democratic, improve the quality of analysis, and
facilitate public acceptance of resulting decisions.119
II.

OUR EXPERIENCE WITH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

Efforts in the United States to evaluate and manage
technology’s consequences fall into three basic categories:
formal technology assessment, which was practiced previously
by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and is practiced
occasionally by other government agencies; environmental
impact assessment, which focuses on the potential health and
environmental effects of policy choices and serves as a form of
technology assessment when applied to technology policy
decisions; and nonregulatory assessment, which is carried out by
technology developers themselves or by other nongovernmental
entities. This Part surveys these efforts and finds that they fall
short in advancing the assessment and public participatory
functions that technology assessment should achieve.
A.

Formal Technology Assessment
1. The Office of Technology Assessment

The very concept of technology assessment arose as
“critical voices within science began calling for preassessment
before committing society to innovations such as supersonic
transport and nuclear weapons.”120 In the United States,
Congress created the OTA in 1972 to provide objective analyses
to inform policy decisions on technology matters. While the
OTA earned the respect of many for the quality of its work on
issues ranging from the feasibility of the Star Wars missile
defense system to the cleanup of nuclear-weapons
laboratories,121 it ultimately played no more than a modest role
in influencing how the United States handles new technologies.

119

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 23-24 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996);
Slovic, supra note 111, at 23.
120
CLINTON S. ANDREWS, HUMBLE ANALYSIS: THE PRACTICE OF JOINT FACTFINDING 48 (2002).
121
See Robert M. Margolis & David H. Guston, The Origins, Accomplishments,
and Demise of the Office of Technology Assessment, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 53, 66; Paul Recer, Office of Technology
Assessment Killed, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Sept. 27, 1995, at 2C.
IN A
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The OTA’s official mission was “to provide early
indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the
applications of technology and to develop other coordinate
information which may assist the Congress.”122 In creating the
OTA, Congress was motivated by several factors, including its
need for an independent source of technical information and
objective analyses, a rise in government spending on scientific
research and development, and growing social unease regarding
the negative effects of science and technology.123 The statute
establishing the OTA declared, “As technology continues to
change and expand rapidly, its applications are . . . increasingly
extensive, pervasive, and critical in their impact, beneficial and
adverse, on the natural and social environment.”124
Although the OTA originally was to perform long-term
analyses regarding entire technological fields, technology
assessment at the OTA was fairly constricted in practice.
Congress’s requests for information tended to emphasize
specific subjects and to require rapid responses, and shortterm, narrow policy analyses eventually came to dominate the
OTA’s workload.125 In an effort to maintain credibility and avoid
alienating members of Congress who might disagree with its
conclusions,126 the agency generally avoided making
recommendations and instead confined itself to surveys of the
technical components of the issues.127 More significantly,
technology assessment came to be understood not as a process,
but as a product—the reports generated by the OTA.128 These
developments are not surprising given the OTA’s subordinate
role and limited mandate. The OTA had no regulatory power
and, in practice, limited advisory power. Nevertheless, the OTA
never fulfilled its potential to study technological applications
122

2 U.S.C. § 472(c) (2006).
See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 53, 54-57.
124
2 U.S.C. § 471(a) (2006).
125
See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 59; Vig & Paschen, supra note 80, at 9.
126
See Nancy Carson, Process, Prescience, and Pragmatism: The Office of
Technology Assessment, in ORGANIZATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: HELPING
GOVERNMENT THINK 236, 243 (Carol H. Weiss ed., 1992).
127
ANDREWS, supra note 120, at 181 (“OTA consciously chose to minimize
normative content in its work. Instead, OTA strove to make its work useful to decision
makers representing diverse perspectives, and who often did not share the same
values.”); Carson, supra note 126, at 249; Daniel Sarewitz, This Won’t Hurt a Bit:
Assessing and Governing Rapidly Advancing Technologies in a Democracy, in
RODEMEYER ET AL., supra note 103; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 10-11.
128
See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 61-62, 71-72; Vig & Paschen,
supra note 80, at 9-10.
123
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and consequences in a broader and more systematic way, or to
transform how Congress and society relate to technology.129
Ultimately, the OTA was unable to maintain the difficult
balancing act of providing objective information to Congress
while securing political support for its continued existence.
Shortly after the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994,
Congress eliminated the agency as part of the new majority’s
promise to enact its “Contract with America.”130 Among the
primary reasons given for eliminating the agency was its slow
pace relative to Congress’s timetables.131 Because the OTA’s
assessments could take one to two years to complete, they often
failed to meet the more pressing political needs of Congress’s
members.132 Also contributing to the OTA’s elimination were
accusations of bias—whether justified or not—often from parties
whose interests were undermined by the OTA’s reports.133
America’s
experiment
with
formal
technology
assessment through an agency dedicated to the task came to an
end with the demise of the OTA. The need for technology
assessment and deliberate management of technology,
however, has not diminished. To the contrary, that need is ever
greater in an era of rapidly developing technologies with
widespread and long-lasting impacts.
2. Institutional Alternatives to the OTA
In the OTA’s absence, a number of governmental
institutions do have some capacity to carry out technology
assessment. Such assessments, however, have been performed
on a narrow and ad hoc basis, if at all, and their scope and
impact have been limited by traditional and legal constraints.134
129

Vig & Paschen, supra note 80, at 9 (“[OTA’s] reports gradually shifted from
technology-driven topics to more problem-focused studies that were less distinctive
from traditional policy analyses than originally envisaged.”).
130
See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 70-71. Congress eliminated all
funding for OTA, but did not formally abolish the agency. Legislative Branch
Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-53, 109 Stat. 468 (1995). Subsequent efforts
to revive the agency with renewed funding have not succeeded. See Bruce L.R. Smith &
Jeffrey K. Stine, Technical Advice for Congress: Past Trends and Present Obstacles, in
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 23, 40.
131
See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 71.
132
See id.
133
Jon M. Peha, Science and Technology Advice for Congress: Past, Present,
and Future, 24 RENEWABLE RESOURCES J. 19, 20-21 (2006).
134
Id. at 22 (noting that existing “organizations already have their own
missions and their own cultures, which are not perfectly compatible with the
technology assessment process”).
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO), for example, has
conducted a few technology assessment pilot projects at
Congress’s direction.135 For the most part, these analyses have
focused on narrow topics related to counterterrorism, such as
the use of biometric technologies for border security and the
use of cybersecurity measures to protect infrastructure.136 The
credibility of the GAO’s work, moreover, is open to question,
given the agency’s traditional expertise in performing audits,
the past use of its reports for partisan political objectives, and
its limited experience with predictive assessments.137 Another
institution, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP),
advises the president on science and technology issues. The
OSTP has the authority to initiate studies, including
technology assessments, to resolve critical and emerging
problems.138 With its fairly limited resources, however, the
OSTP has focused primarily on serving as a channel of
communication between the president and the scientific
community and on coordinating science and technology policy
across the federal government.139 Lastly, the National Research
Council (NRC) issues reports on science and technology topics
in response to congressional and agency requests.140 These
135

GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21586, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT IN CONGRESS: HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 4-6 (2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21586.pdf.
136
See id.; e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-321, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT: CYBERSECURITY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04321.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf.
137
See Christopher T. Hill, An Expanded Analytical Capability in the
Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, or the Congressional Budget
Office, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 106, 115-16;
Hearing on 2011 Appropriations Before the Subcomm. on Legislative Branch Appropriations
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (written testimony of Francesca T.
Grifo, Senior Scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/solutions/big_picture_solutions/restoring-theota.html.
138
42 U.S.C. § 6614(a)(5) (2006). The OSTP’s statutory mission is to serve “as a
source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with
respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.” Id. § 6614(a).
139
DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34736, THE PRESIDENT’S
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP): ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5-7, 24-25
(2009), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/09Mar/RL34736.pdf. The OSTP
receives external advice from the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST), whose members are selected from industry, education, research, and other
nongovernmental institutions. PCAST conducts workshops and convenes technical advisory
groups that could carry out technology assessment functions. Id. at 9, 24-25.
140
See John Ahearne & Peter Blair, Expanded Use of the National Academies,
in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 118, 118-19,
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authoritative reports are prepared by committees of leading
experts through an extensive, peer-reviewed study process.141
While well respected, these reports require significant time and
resources to produce,142 and they are designed to generate
expert recommendations in response to specific questions
rather than to raise issues independently, address broader
policy questions, or foster public debate.143
B.

NEPA as Technology Assessment

Technology assessment can also take place in the
context of environmental impact assessment. In particular, the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal
agencies to assess the environmental impacts of their actions.144
To the extent that such actions involve the development or
implementation of technology, NEPA analysis could serve as a
form of technology assessment with respect to health and
environmental effects. The federal government’s extensive
involvement or potential involvement in sponsoring research
and development,145 establishing technology policies, and
regulating technology’s adverse impacts underscores NEPA’s
prospective reach. Nevertheless, narrow interpretations of
NEPA by agencies and courts have minimized the statute’s
value in technology assessment.

123. The NRC is the operating arm of the National Academies, which include the
National Academy of Sciences, a private, nonprofit organization established by
congressional charter. Id. at 118.
141
Id. at 120; DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34454, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICYMAKING: A PRIMER 29 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RL34454.pdf.
142
Ahearne & Blair, supra note 140, at 121; Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 34 (noting that the peer-review process ensures quality and balance, but takes time).
143
SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 19; Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 4 (“[T]he
Academies have only a limited independent capacity to raise questions that no political
sponsor has an incentive to want answered.”). In addition, the National Academy of
Sciences, and thus the NRC, is a private institution that can reject Congressional
requests. Hearing on 2011 Amendments, supra note 137, at 4.
144
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
145
The 2009 federal budget, for instance, provided $1.5 billion to support
nanotechnology research and development through thirteen federal agencies. EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, FY 2009 BUDGET AND
HIGHLIGHTS (2008), available at http://www.nano.gov/NNI_FY09_budget_summary.pdf.
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1. The Basics of NEPA
Sometimes described as a “Magna Carta” for the
environment,146 NEPA was enacted with the purpose of
integrating environmental values into national policies and
planning processes. The central requirement of NEPA is the
environmental impact statement (EIS), a document that must
be prepared for “major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment.”147 In the EIS, the
government must describe the environmental impacts of the
proposed action, including unavoidable adverse effects;
alternatives to the proposed action; and any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources that the proposed
action would involve.148 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
the purpose of the EIS requirement is to
ensure[] that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have
available, and will carefully consider, detailed information
concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees
that the relevant information will be made available to the larger
audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking
process and the implementation of that decision.149

But NEPA was not meant merely to impose a
requirement on agencies to document environmental impacts.
Rather, NEPA was intended to achieve a wholesale
reorientation of the government’s actions and values,
sensitizing agencies to environmental values.150 Through
programmatic EISs, for example, agencies could evaluate the
environmental impacts of entire programs—not just individual

146

DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (2d ed. 1992); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2010) (characterizing NEPA as “our basic national charter
for protection of the environment”).
147
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
148
Id.
149
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
For federal actions deemed to have less than significant impacts on the environment,
agencies still must make a more limited inquiry known as an environmental
assessment (EA), which identifies the environmental consequences of a proposed action
and documents the agency’s determination that those consequences do not reach the
statutory threshold of significance. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9 (2010).
150
MATTHEW J. LINDSTROM & ZACHARY A. SMITH, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL MISCONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE
& EXECUTIVE NEGLECT 8 (2001). Senator Henry Jackson, NEPA’s main sponsor, touted
NEPA as “the most important and far-reaching environmental and conservation measure
ever enacted by the Congress.” 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969).
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projects—and reorient the programs in light of those impacts.151
But whether NEPA created any enforceable substantive
obligations, including any that might apply to new
technologies, was not obvious on the face of the statute.152
2. Implementing and Interpreting NEPA
The implementation of NEPA by federal agencies and
its interpretation by the courts have not fulfilled the promise
embodied in the statute’s broad language and legislative
history. NEPA’s primary mandate, the requirement that
federal agencies prepare an EIS, has turned out to be less
powerful than some of its crafters might have envisioned. First,
that mandate applies only to “major federal actions”;153 it does
not apply to private actions or to most legislation enacted by
Congress.154 Moreover, the Supreme Court has construed the
EIS requirement to impose only a procedural duty, rather than
to mandate substantive results.155 This does not necessarily
make the EIS requirement a toothless one; federal agencies,
having analyzed the environmental ramifications of their
decisions, may make decisions that are more environmentally
sound than they would be otherwise. Nonetheless, agencies
sometimes view the EIS as little more than a paper-pushing
hurdle to be overcome before the agency can proceed with a
predetermined course of action.156
151

40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2010) (encouraging practice of tiering analysis of sitespecific actions to broader EISs).
152
See, e.g., Denis Binder, NEPA, NIMBYs and New Technology, 25 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 11 (1990) (arguing that “those seeking to obstruct the application of
new technology and processes [through NEPA] will have to find a new legal tool to rely
on” because agencies need only make requisite disclosures). At the time of NEPA’s
enactment, many legislators viewed the statute as an uncontroversial way to burnish
their environmental credentials, and the legislation received relatively little attention
from lobbyists and interest groups. See RICHARD A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH 10-11 (1976).
153
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
154
Although the EIS requirement applies to agency “proposals for legislation,”
id., the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations define legislation
narrowly to include only legislative proposals “developed by or with the significant
cooperation and support of a Federal agency” and to exclude requests for
appropriations, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (2010).
155
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989)
(noting that NEPA relies “on procedural mechanisms—as opposed to substantive,
result-based standards”); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for
the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.”).
156
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS iii (1997) (“Some [agencies]
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Supreme Court decisions have played a critical role in
constraining the statute’s reach and effectiveness. First, in
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), the Court rejected the argument
that an EIS must be integrated into an agency’s decisionmaking process from the outset.157 Rather, only when an agency
“makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal
action” must an EIS be prepared.158 Then, in Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, the Court held that the mere contemplation of a project
and preparation of a study do not trigger the obligation to
prepare a programmatic EIS absent a proposal for federal
action.159 Together, SCRAP and Kleppe allowed agencies to defer
analyzing environmental impacts until after the overall policymaking process is well underway.160 Although these decisions did
not specifically involve new technologies, the negative
implications for attempting to situate an effective technology
assessment function within NEPA analyses are clear.
The Court made its most direct pronouncements
regarding the analyses of new technologies in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc.161 In this challenge to licenses granted to specific nuclear
facilities, the Court rejected the notion that NEPA provides a
forum for the wholesale consideration of the desirability of new
technologies:
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it
may not. But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear
energy, establishing a reasonable review process in which courts are
act as if the [EIS] . . . is an end in itself, rather than a tool to enhance and improve
decision-making.”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 922-23
(2002) (contending that NEPA documentation is often “overstuff[ed] . . . with
information from every available source, regardless of its quality,” but that little
evidence suggests that the information discussed in such documentation actually
influences agency decisionmaking).
157
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 320-22 (1975).
158
Id. at 320.
159
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976).
160
As various critics have pointed out, the preparation of environmental
documentation in practice often remains separated from much of the decision-making
process. Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Impact Assessments:
Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,605, 10,609 (2009) (“[T]he EIS
process has been isolated from agencies’ primary decision processes.”); Oliver A. Houck,
How’d We Get Divorced?: The Curious Case of NEPA and Planning, 39 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,645, 10,648-49 (2009).
161
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
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to play only a limited role. The fundamental policy questions
appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are
not subject to reexamination in the federal courts . . . . NEPA does
set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.162

In Vermont Yankee, the Court correctly recognized that NEPA’s
obligations do not apply to legislative decisions, and that
democratic institutions—Congress and state legislatures—
should resolve fundamental policy questions. Nonetheless, the
Court failed to appreciate NEPA’s potential to inform those
decisions and to guide agencies in the exercise of policy-making
authority delegated to them. Rather, the Court continued to
steer agencies towards a narrow, technocratic approach to
NEPA analysis that has prevailed ever since. The Court’s
opinions have not ended the preparation of programmatic
EISs—the sort of overarching analyses that could serve as a
useful instrument of technology assessment—but many
agencies try to defer programmatic assessments as long as
possible if not all together.163 Ultimately, NEPA has not lived up
to its potential to serve as a tool for analyzing the environmental
risks and uncertainties of major policy developments, including
the development of new technologies. In the words of Oliver
Houck: “NEPA is missing the point. It is producing lots of little
statements on highway segments, timber sales, and other
foregone conclusions; it isn’t even present, much less effective,
when the major decisions . . . are made.”164
C.

Nonregulatory Mechanisms

Technology assessments can be carried out not only by
government agencies, but also by those directly engaged in
technology development. Researchers, for example, may look to
personal morals and professional ethics to guide, shape, and
constrain their research pursuits. The predominant model of
technology development, however, is for scientists and
engineers to conceive of technology instrumentally; that is, as
value free and neutral, not based on morals.165 This model does
162

Id. at 557-58.
Jon C. Cooper, Broad Programmatic, Policy and Planning Assessments
Under the National Environmental Policy Act and Similar Devices: A Quiet Revolution in
an Approach to Environmental Considerations, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 117-18 (1993).
164
Houck, supra note 160, at 10,648.
165
See Erik Fisher & Clark A. Miller, Collaborative Practices for Contextualizing
the Engineering Laboratory, in ENGINEERING IN CONTEXT 369, 376 (S.H. Christensen et
163
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not encourage researchers to consider their work in a broader
context or in an ethically critical way.166 Furthermore,
researchers—including those in academic institutions—face
strong economic incentives to tailor their efforts in favor of
technologies with marketing potential.167
Firms may have a stronger incentive to carry out health
and safety assessments with respect to the technologies they
develop and market, given their greater potential for legal
liability or reputational damage. Indeed, corporations can and
often do go beyond what the law explicitly requires.168 With
respect to new technologies, corporations might, for example,
assess potential social and environmental consequences with
an unusual degree of care, reach out to the public to try to
identify and address externalities, or choose not to develop
hazardous applications despite their potential for profit.169 Such
actions need not be altruistic; they can translate into lower
costs, reduced risk exposure, the avoidance of onerous
regulation, and an ability to command higher product
premiums.170 In addition, companies may lose their social
al. eds., 2009); Byron Newberry, Are Engineers Instrumentalists?, 29 TECH. SOC’Y 107,
109, 112-13 (2007); see also J. Britt Holbrook, Assessing the Science-Society Relation: The
Case of the US National Science Foundation’s Second Merit Review Criterion, 27 TECH.
SOC’Y 437, 438 (2005) (describing institutionalization of Vannevar Bush’s views regarding
the degree of autonomy necessary for basic scientific research).
166
See Fisher & Miller, supra note 165, at 376.
167
See JASANOFF, supra note 91, at 235-36 (describing the effect of industrial
funding of university research and of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed recipients of
federal grants to patent discoveries funded by federal money).
168
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), broadly defined, refers
to socially beneficial decisions and actions by firms that go beyond the legal minimum.
Paul R. Portney, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Public Policy
Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
FIRMS 107, 108 (Bruce L. Hay et al. eds., 2005). A narrower definition of CSR focuses
on profit-sacrificing behavior by businesses acting under moral or social obligations.
Summary of Discussion on Corporate Social Responsibility and Economics, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra, at
145, 146. Whether such activity—which is arguably contrary to the very purpose of
private corporations and to the interest of shareholders—exists at a meaningful level is
a matter of debate. Id. at 146 (noting that a number of discussion participants “were
quick to point out that profit-sacrificing behavior is exceedingly difficult to observe”).
169
Daniel C. Esty, On Portney’s Complaint: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Social Responsibility, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 168, at 137, 141-42 (suggesting ways in which
CSR could be reconceptualized).
170
Forest L. Reinhardt, Environmental Protection and the Social
Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from the Business Literature, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 168, at 151, 159-68.
In addition, banks and insurance companies often have an interest in overseeing the
risk exposure of their clients. See DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO
GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE
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license to operate should they fail to live up to social
expectations about environmental behavior.171 Whatever their
motivation may be, however, it is unlikely that firms’ efforts
along these lines will lead to adequate technology assessment.
Firms are profit-seeking entities whose ultimate obligations
are to their shareholders.172 Often, the analyses that firms
undertake are internal assessments that focus on marketing
potential and do little to inform policymakers or to involve the
public in fundamental decisions about technology.173
III.

REVITALIZING TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

As a society, we are not doing enough to assess the
health and environmental effects of emerging technologies or to
involve the public and incorporate its values into decisions
about technology. This Part considers options for addressing
these inadequacies: reconstituting the OTA or reinvigorating
NEPA practice would be relatively simple ways to increase our
understanding of new technologies, but achieving substantive
change and meaningful participation will require more radical
reforms.
A.

Resurrecting Old Tools
1. Reconstituting the OTA

Reestablishing the Office of Technology Assessment would
be a modest first step towards building societal capacity to make

VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 11, 94-95 (2006). The re-insurance
company Swiss Re, for instance, has been active in drawing attention to potential risks
of nanoparticles. See Arie Rip, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Bridging Gaps
Through Constructive Technology Assessment, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSDISCIPLINARY
RESEARCH 145, 152 (G. Hirsch Hadorn et al. eds., 2008). If the uncertainties associated
with the adverse consequences of a technology are too great, however, insurers may
exert little constraint on the behavior of firms.
171
See ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 170, at 12.
172
Portney, supra note 168, at 126 (contending that almost all examples of
CSR are profit-motivated); see also Summary of Discussion, supra note 168, at 146
(recounting the view that avoiding tort liability and influencing future regulation
explain beyond-compliance behavior).
173
David J. Vogel, Opportunities for and Limitations of Corporate
Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF FIRMS, supra note 168, at 197, 199 (contending that as an empirical matter, selfregulation is inadequate to address adverse effects and arguing that government
regulation is responsible for almost all improvements in environmental quality).
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informed and accountable decisions about new technologies.174
Such a move would address Congress’s ongoing need for informed
and objective advice on scientific and technical matters.175 Indeed,
since the OTA’s elimination, several proposals have been made
either to create a new technology assessment office or to authorize
funding to reestablish the OTA.176 None of these proposals has
gained much traction, however.177 Few current members of
Congress have had any experience with the OTA,178 and a truly
independent technology assessment office might raise broad, longrange concerns that are not politically expedient to address.179 In
addition, while the reestablishment of the OTA could contribute
to better informed policymaking, an OTA patterned after its
predecessor would not generate new information on the hazards
of emerging technologies, nor bring about broad and meaningful
public engagement. Revitalized technology assessment should
involve not only an OTA-like institution, but also other measures
that can bring about dynamic and participatory technology
management, as Part III.B will explain.
2. Recapturing NEPA’s Lost Potential
Another modest step towards improving societal
decision making on technology would involve more robust
implementation of NEPA. As discussed above, current
implementation of NEPA entails little wholesale consideration
of technological developments and their ramifications for
society and the environment.180 Overall, NEPA practice is a pale
shadow of the possibilities embodied in the statute.181 The
implementation of NEPA can better reflect the technological
concerns that motivated its enactment. Changes in
174

See Daryl E. Chubin, Filling the Policy Vacuum Created by OTA’s Demise,
ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 2000-2001, at 31; Gerald L. Epstein & Ashton B. Carter, A
Dedicated Organization in Congress, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR
CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 157.
175
See Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 3.
176
KNEZO, supra note 135, at 2-4.
177
See id. at 4; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 18.
178
Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 4.
179
Id. at 4-5.
180
See supra Part II.B.2.
181
This view is shared by numerous critics. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 160,
at 10,605 (identifying “shortcomings of current environmental assessment
procedures”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333
(2004) (discussing potential NEPA reforms); Daniel R. Mandelker, Thoughts on NEPA
at 40, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,640 (2009) (arguing for greater application of NEPA
analyses to agency programs and not just individual projects).
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implementation would provide only a partial response to
emerging technologies, however, since NEPA’s scope is confined
to those developments that involve federal agency action.
a. NEPA’s Concern with Technology
NEPA requires agencies to adopt a long-term
orientation that considers environmental consequences for
present as well as future generations.182 Thus, EISs must
discuss “the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity,” as well as “any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources.”183 Moreover, the
statute explicitly recognizes “the profound influences of . . . new
and expanding technological advances” on the environment and
declares a purpose of “promot[ing] efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere.”184 The
statute’s objective of transforming the relationship between
human activity, productivity, and long-term effects on the
environment necessarily requires new ways of analyzing and
managing modern technologies.
NEPA’s legislative history singles out the dangers posed
by technology even more explicitly. In floor debates and
committee hearings, various congressmen expressed their
individual concerns about the damage done by technology to
the environment.185 Quoting an editorial that appeared in the
New York Times, the House committee responsible for
considering NEPA legislation singled out technology as the
greatest threat to the environment:
182

JAMES MCELFISH & ELISSA PARKER, REDISCOVERING THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACK TO THE FUTURE 12-15 (1995).
183
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
184
Id. §§ 4321, 4331(a).
185
On the House side, see, for example, 115 CONG. REC. 26,569, 26,577 (1969)
(statement of Rep. Farbstein) (“For too long, we have stressed technological progress,
assuming that our environment could take care of itself.”); id. at 26,583 (statement of
Rep. Donohue) (“Every school child and adult in this country is well aware that the
advance of modern technology, however great its material benefits, has been
unrestrained in its accompanying afflictions upon us through byproducts that
increasingly poison our air and pollute our waters.”); id. (statement of Rep. Cohelan)
(“We are fast becoming a victim of our own technology and progress.”). On the Senate
side, see, for example, 115 CONG. REG. 40,415, 40,417 (1969) (statement of Sen.
Jackson) (“While the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is not a panacea, it is
a starting point. A great deal more, however, remains to be done . . . if mankind and
human dignity are not to be ground down in the years ahead by the expansive and
impersonal technology modern science has created.”).
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By land, sea, and air, the enemies of man’s survival relentlessly
press their attack. The most dangerous of all these enemies is man’s
own undirected technology. The radioactive poisons from nuclear
tests, the runoff into rivers of nitrogen fertilizers, the smog from
automobiles, the pesticides in the food chains, and the destruction of
topsoil by strip mining are examples of the failure to foresee and
control the untoward consequences of modern technology.186

The counterpart committee in the Senate likewise recognized
the dangers posed by “[a] growing technological power which is
far outstripping man’s capacity to understand and ability to
control its impact on the environment.”187 Indeed, an influential
report prepared for that committee singled out technology as
the root cause of the perceived environmental crisis:
Technology . . . has greatly increased environmental stress in
general. The net result has been enormously increased demands
upon the environment in addition to the increase in
population. . . . Unfortunately, our productive technology has been
accompanied by side effects which we did not forsee [sic]. . . . It is
now becoming apparent that we cannot continue to enjoy the
benefits of our productive economy unless we bring its harmful side
effects under control.188

That report called for a “pay-as-you-go” approach to the
development and use of technology, under which the cost of
environmental
harms
would
be
internalized,
with
“provision . . . made
for
the
protection,
restoration,
replacement, or rehabilitation of elements in the environment
before, or at the time, these resources are used.”189
b. The EIS as Technology Assessment
The effects of emerging technologies were undoubtedly
an important motivation behind NEPA’s enactment, and the
EIS was to be a central tool for identifying and better
managing these effects.190 Indeed, early judicial interpretations
186

H.R. REP. NO. 91-378, at 3 (1969).
S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 6 (1969); see also id. at 8 (identifying population
growth and “advancing technological developments which have enlarged man’s capacity
to effectuate environmental change” as primary causes for environmental concern).
188
115 CONG. REC. 29,069 (1969) (reprinting A National Policy for the
Environment: A Report on the Need for a National Policy for the Environment, Special
Report to the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong. (1968)).
189
Id. at 29,070.
190
See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE xvi (1998) (“[T]he procedural requirements of NEPA
are intended to force attention to the policies declared in the Statement of
Purpose . . . and in Title I (Section 101) of the Act.”).
187
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of NEPA recognized the potential for EISs to enable a proactive
and comprehensive approach to new technologies. The opinion
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Scientists’ Institute for Public Information,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission (SIPI),191 issued three years
after NEPA’s enactment, exemplifies this approach. In SIPI,
the plaintiffs alleged that the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) was required to prepare an EIS for its breeder reactor
program, which was in the research and development stage.
The AEC conceded that an EIS would be required before the
construction of individual breeder reactors and facilities, but
argued that no NEPA analysis was required for the research
and development program as a whole.
Recognizing “NEPA’s objective of controlling the impact
of technology on the environment,” the court rejected the AEC’s
arguments.192 The court explained that environmental analysis
of the research and development program was necessary
because the program would facilitate subsequent use of breeder
reactor technology by private parties that in turn would affect
the environment.193 In the words of the court: “[T]he decisions
our society makes today as to the direction of research and
development will determine what technologies are available 10,
20, or 30 years hence . . . .”194 As the court further noted,
consideration of a technology’s environmental impacts would be
far more meaningful at the research and development stage
than at the point when specific facilities are being
constructed.195 Once a specific project is in mind, substantial
resources have already been committed in developing the
technology, and vested interests in that technology—perhaps
including the regulatory agency itself—will undermine the
objectivity of the decision-making process.196 Only a
programmatic EIS at the research and development stage, in
the court’s view, would fulfill NEPA’s purpose of informing
Congress, the executive branch, and the public of the

191

Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n (SIPI), 481
F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
192
Id. at 1089.
193
Id. at 1088-89.
194
Id. at 1090.
195
Id. at 1089-90.
196
Id. at 1089-90 & n.43.
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environmental effects of new technologies in such a way as to
ensure informed decision making.197
The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the EIS obligation in
SIPI is consistent with NEPA’s text as well as its implementing
regulations, and it hews closely to Congress’s purpose in
enacting NEPA. As noted earlier, an EIS must be prepared for
“major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.”198 NEPA does not define major federal
actions, but federal decisions and policies regarding new
technologies often do have a significant effect on environmental
quality. Moreover, NEPA’s regulations provide that major
federal action, “include[s] new and continuing activities,
including projects and programs entirely or partly financed,
assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal
agencies.”199 The regulations also indicate that agencies may
conduct their evaluations “[b]y stage of technological
development including federal or federally assisted research,
development or demonstration programs for new technologies
which, if applied, could significantly affect the quality of the
human environment.”200
In light of these regulations and the SIPI analysis,
federal research funding decisions should be treated as major
federal actions subject to NEPA. The nature of the
environmental analysis and level of detail will depend on the
stage of technological research and development. Where the
funding is for basic research in a new field, discussion of possible
environmental effects may necessarily be general and couched in
uncertainty. Where research involves technology nearing
commercialization or deployment, however, a more thorough and
specific environmental analysis should be prepared.201 The EIS,

197

Id. at 1089-90.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
199
40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2010). One category of major federal actions
identified in the regulation includes “[a]doption of programs, such as a group of
concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan.” Id. § 1508.18(b)(3).
200
Id. § 1502.4.
201
Cf. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094 (discussing factors to be considered by an agency
in deciding when to draft an EIS for a technology development program, including
likelihood that technology will prove commercially feasible, and availability of
meaningful information on effects of technology and alternatives). Post-SIPI decisions
have declined to mandate preparation of programmatic impact statements for
unrelated research projects, but environmental analyses of individual projects continue
to be required. See, e.g., Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 884-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (no programmatic EIS required for “diverse and discrete” animal
productivity research projects); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C.
198
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in sum, is a well-suited vehicle for agencies to study and
consider an emerging technology’s potential consequences—
environmental or otherwise—during developmental stages and
before a technology has become entrenched.
c. Other NEPA Tools for Technology Assessment
NEPA also contains other mechanisms that could be
used to better manage new technologies. Section 101 of the
statute expresses Congress’s concern about the environmental
impacts of new technologies and suggests the dawning of a
more thoughtful approach to the relationship between
technology and the environment:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,
particularly the profound influences of . . . new and expanding
technological advances . . . , declares that it is the continuing policy
of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations
of Americans.202

Section 101 is a policy statement that the Supreme Court has
held to be judicially unenforceable.203 Nonetheless, the provision
represents a broad, government-wide commitment to address
the potential dangers of new technologies204 and thereby to foster
“conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony.” Section 101, in other words, provides federal agencies
with direction and authority to make discretionary choices—
Cir. 1985) (vacating lower court injunction of GMO deliberate release experiments in
absence of programmatic EIS).
202
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
203
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (stressing that NEPA does establish substantive goals, but imposes only
procedural duties). Compare Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental
Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 355 (2003) (“Section 101 of NEPA declares a national
policy for the environment in a provision with no direct regulatory force.”), and Michael
C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty, 20 ENVTL. L. 447, 450
(1990) (noting Supreme Court decisions “ignoring the high-minded aspirations
contained in section 101 and apparently considering NEPA to require just the
paperwork and public disclosure specified in section 102”), with Nicholas C. Yost,
NEPA’s Promise—Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533, 548 (1990) (“[S]ection
102(1) . . . explicitly requires all agencies to follow the policies of section 101. That is a
substantive requirement, and it is appropriately judicially enforceable.”).
204
CALDWELL, supra note 190, at xvi (“NEPA, as policy, is a ‘template’ against
which decisions affecting the environment can be compared for consistency with its
declared principles.”).
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whether in determining technology priorities, funding research
and development, or investigating potential technology
hazards—in ways that reduce environmental damage, mitigate
harmful effects, and maximize public input.205
NEPA also established an institutional mechanism to
study and address the environmental ramifications of new
technologies: the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).
The CEQ’s functions were to include the gathering of
information concerning conditions and trends in environmental
quality—including the environmental impacts of new
technologies.206 Congressional debate on the provisions to
establish the CEQ repeatedly emphasized the authority of the
CEQ to conduct research and provide policy advice regarding
the long-overlooked environmental consequences of new
technologies.207 And shortly after NEPA’s enactment, President
Nixon issued an executive order directing the CEQ to “[f]oster
investigations, studies, surveys, research, and analyses
relating to (i) ecological systems and environmental quality, (ii)
the impact of new and changing technologies thereon, and (iii)
means of preventing or reducing adverse effects from such
208
Just as the Council of Economic Advisers
technologies.”
provides economic advice to the president, the CEQ would
oversee the execution of NEPA’s declared policy of protecting

205

See Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental
Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 207, 211-17 (1992) (discussing potential substantive mandates under NEPA).
206
42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2006); see also National Environmental Policy: Hearing
on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
91st Cong. (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson upon introducing NEPA legislation),
available at 1970 NEPA Leg. Hist. 30 (LEXIS) (“The Council would . . . help the
President evaluate the trends of new technologies and developments as they affect our
total surroundings, and to develop broad policies, including those related to
anticipatory research, to prevent future man-induced environmental changes which
could have serious social and economic consequences.”).
207
See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 26,569, 26,575 (1969) (statement of Rep.
Schadeberg) (“If such a council existed at the time of the invention of the automobile,
perhaps we would have been able to realize the threat that would be presented to our
atmosphere by the internal combustion of hydrocarbons before it was too late.”); id. at
26,583-84 (statement of Rep. Cohelan) (“The proposed five-man Council would provide a
broad and independent overview of . . . environmental problems that have been created
by advancing technology.”); id. at 26,585 (statement of Rep. Boland) (“[T]here is a growing
body of evidence that society is paying a high price in environmental pollution for the
advantages that flow from the rapid spread of technology. . . . [CEQ will] provide a vitally
needed source for reviewing the total environmental situation—an ‘early warning’ system
that warns us of the effect on the environment of a particular program.”).
208
Exec. Order No. 11,514 § 3(k), 35 Fed. Reg. 4247, 4248 (Mar. 7, 1970).
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the environment and provide advice as to what actions should
209
be taken to further that policy.
The role of the CEQ, however, has turned out to be far
more circumscribed than originally envisioned. The CEQ has
issued regulations and guidance documents that have played a
significant role in the implementation of the EIS requirement.210
But the CEQ’s broader mission of anticipating environmental
problems and providing policy advice has been largely
neglected.211 The CEQ has been poorly funded and since 1980
has operated through a single member rather than through a
full council of three.212 The CEQ nonetheless retains its
statutory authority to analyze environmental trends, to study
the environmental impacts of new technologies, and to play a
greater role in policymaking. With robust support from
Congress and the president—support that it has not received to
date—the CEQ could exercise that authority to play a key role
in technology assessment.213 In particular, the CEQ’s most
valuable function could be to take the lead in identifying
emerging technologies and potential hazards that might be
associated with them, thereby laying the groundwork for more
detailed assessment, policy initiatives, or legislative action.214
209

See CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 38-42; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2006)
(describing CEQ’s duties and functions).
210
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1508.28 (2010); Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026
(1981). Recently, the CEQ has turned its attention to how agencies should incorporate
climate change analyses into environmental review documents. Memorandum from
Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the Council on Envtl. Quality, on Draft NEPA Guidance on
Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Feb.
18, 2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_of_
GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_02182010.pdf; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 79-81
(2008); Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into
Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 48-49, 52-55
(2009); Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of
Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 475-76 (2010).
211
See CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 39-42; see also Scott C. Whitney, The
Role of the President’s Council on Environmental Quality in the 1990’s and Beyond, 6 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 81, 104 (1991) (recommending that CEQ devote its energy to serving
as an expert advisory body).
212
CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 39-42; LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 150,
at 130-31; Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy from the 1970s to
the 1990s: Continuity and Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 3, 19
(Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994). Indeed, several proposals have
been made for the CEQ’s elimination. LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 150, at 130-31.
213
See CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 156-57.
214
Cf. Jonathan Zasloff, Choose the Best Answer: Organizing Climate Change
Negotiation in the Obama Administration, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 330, 335-36
(2009) (“Presidents have used the CEQ as a vehicle for administering their pet projects.”).
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Technology Assessment 2.0

A reconstituted OTA and revitalized NEPA process
would improve our understanding of emerging technologies and
our policies towards them. But genuine transformation of our
relationship with such technologies requires redesigned
technology assessment and additional mechanisms to
incorporate careful analysis and public participation.
In conventional technology assessment (conventional
TA), the OTA considered the potential impacts of a relatively
finished technology and submitted the results in reports to
Congress. This form of technology assessment was quite
limited: its purposes were relatively circumscribed, its intended
audience was narrow, and its impacts were uncertain. Rather
than attempting to involve the public or to comprehensively
project the consequences of new technological developments,
the OTA took on the more manageable task of summarizing the
existing state of knowledge on narrowly focused issues.215 And
as noted above, the term technology assessment was commonly
understood to refer to the OTA’s written reports, rather than
the entire assessment process.216
An important factor in the relative ineffectiveness of
conventional TA is the longstanding separation of the
promotion of technology from its control and regulation.217
Conventional TA, in other words, had little effect on the
technology development process itself and exercised whatever
modest influence it had by contributing towards regulation as
an “after-the-fact gatekeeper.”218 Furthermore, conventional TA
tended to treat technology decisions as single-shot decisions
rather than as ongoing processes.219 The process of analyzing a
technology, however, is an integral aspect of technology
management.220 Depending on who participates in TA and how
TA is carried out, these processes themselves can have a
critical influence on the shapes and uses of a technology. The
separation of technical analysis—conducted by the OTA—from
215

Sarewitz, supra note 127, at 3; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the
fairly constricted practice of technology assessment at the OTA).
216
See supra text accompanying note 128.
217
See Arie Rip et al., Constructive Technology Assessment: A New Paradigm for
Managing Technology in Society, in MANAGING TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY: THE APPROACH
OF CONSTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 1, 2 (Arie Rip et al. eds., 1995).
218
Id.
219
See id. at 7-8.
220
See WESTRUM, supra note 79, at 325.
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the decision-making process in Congress meant that there was
little assurance that the OTA’s analysis would make a
difference.221 And because the conventional TA process was
limited largely to experts, it was relatively distant from
democratic control and unresponsive to public values.
In an effort to address the deficiencies of conventional
TA, various countries have experimented with modified forms
of TA, including participatory technology assessment (PTA)
and constructive technology assessment (CTA). These more
recent forms of TA represent important advances, but would
benefit from further reforms to improve the analysis of
emerging technologies and better incorporate public values.
1. Participatory Technology Assessment
Like conventional TA, PTA considers technology options
that have already been developed. Unlike conventional TA,
however, PTA actively seeks to incorporate outside viewpoints
and public values into the assessment process by involving a
wider range of actors.222 Participants in PTA include lay
members of the public, as well as stakeholders and experts.223 In
widening the scope of participation, PTA may perform
functions such as educating the public, stimulating public
debate, setting the political agenda, breaking a political
stalemate, and informing decisionmakers of public opinions
and values.224 PTA does not, however, replace or eliminate the
expert assessment function of conventional TA. Rather, PTA
complements this function by providing more information on
the social acceptability of a technology and by bolstering the
credibility of expert assessments.225 PTA’s strength, in other
words, lies in its ability to introduce public values into
decisions concerning technology.
PTA taps into both participatory and representative
conceptions of democracy. Citizens who take part in PTA engage
directly and extensively with critical issues, and their views and

221

See Sarewitz, supra note 127, at 4 (“[C]onventional TA embodies a sort of
hyper-rational approach to decision making whose greatest error lies not in its unrealistic
expectation of accurate predictions, but in its linear view of how decisions should be made.”).
222
See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 9, 23-24; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 24-25.
223
See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 9.
224
See id. at 130, 137-39.
225
See id. at 170.
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conclusions may be presented to decisionmakers.226 Participants
are not accountable to constituents nor do they formally
represent particular interests, but they are expected to reflect
varying viewpoints.227 PTA differs from the more familiar
participatory format of town hall meetings in this
representational aspect, as well as in the depth of citizen
involvement.228 Unlike polls or focus groups, which are
comparatively superficial means of gauging public opinion, PTA
strives to elicit citizens’ views in a policy-making context after
citizens have had an opportunity to learn about and reflect upon
an issue.229 And because panel membership is drawn from a pool
of randomly selected individuals, PTA is less subject to political
capture or grandstanding than are advisory commissions.230
PTA techniques for assessing new technologies include
consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, and planning cells. All
of these techniques organize lay persons into panels that
consult over several days and consider the input of experts and
others.231 In a consensus conference, for example, a multiday
public meeting is convened to foster a dialogue between a panel
of fifteen to twenty-five citizens and a group of experts.232
Citizens invited to serve on the panel are drawn from a random
sample of the population and then selected through an

226

See Ida-Elisabeth Andersen & Birgit Jæger, Scenario Workshops and
Consensus Conferences: Towards More Democratic Decision-Making, 26 SCI. & PUB.
POL’Y 331, 334 (1999).
227
See id.
228
Cf. ANNA COOTE & JO LENAGHAN, CITIZENS’ JURIES: THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 7 (1997) (noting potential for public meetings to be dominated by selfselected, seasoned activists or narrow interests who simply rehearse fixed positions).
229
Ned Crosby, Citizens’ Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental
Questions, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING
MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 157, 173 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995);
Georg Hörning, Citizens’ Panels as a Form of Deliberative Technology Assessment, 26
SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 358 (1999); see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participation and
Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN
VALUES 226, 234 (1990) (noting that surveys “isolate problems and issues from their
social and community context”); COOTE & LENAGHAN, supra note 228, at 6 (describing
polls as “superficial and non-interactive, designed to elicit the uninformed views of the
public”); Fischhoff, supra note 110, at 79 (“Polls might obtain snapshots of current
beliefs; however, those beliefs should have little value for policymakers who are
contemplating long-term policies or anticipating the outcome of an intensive public
debate.”). For a critical view of citizens’ juries, see Audrey Armour, The Citizens’ Jury
Model of Public Participation: A Critical Evaluation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra, at 175, 181.
230
SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 34.
231
See Hörning, supra note 229, at 351.
232
Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 331; Hörning, supra note 229, at 352.
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application process.233 Applicants submit a statement
explaining their interest in participation, and these statements
are used to identify persons sufficiently dedicated to
participate.234 Assisted throughout the process by a facilitator
trained in communication skills and cooperative techniques,
the panel conducts two preparatory meetings prior to the
consensus conference.235 At these meetings, panel members
learn basic information about the technology at issue and
formulate questions to be addressed at the conference.236 At the
conference itself, experts (selected in part by the citizen panel)
present their answers to the panel’s questions; citizens may
then cross-examine the experts.237 In some instances, interest
group representatives and members of the audience may
participate in the discussion as well.238 After the discussion
period, the citizen panel prepares a consensus-based report
presenting its conclusions and recommendations.239 The report
has no binding effect, but is available to the public, experts,
and politicians for their consideration.240
Other PTA techniques may differ in the details of
implementation, but the underlying purposes are the same: to
involve the public and incorporate public input more effectively
into decisions regarding technology.241 Citizens’ juries, for
example, generate lay findings and recommendations on
focused policy questions in a process akin to a jury trial, often
in a local or regional context.242 Planning cells also involve
randomly selected citizens in a trial-like process, but
participants have more freedom than citizens’ juries to design
policy options and to consider a range of concerns.243
233

Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 335-36; FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS,
EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 235 (2000) (suggesting that use of sociodemographic
criteria to select participants results in panels that are “generally a reasonable cross
section of ordinary citizens with no special interest or knowledge”).
234
See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 235.
235
See id. at 235-36.
236
Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 331.
237
See id.
238
Id.; FISCHER, supra note 233, at 236-37.
239
Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 331-32.
240
Id. at 335-36.
241
See generally Hörning, supra note 229, at 352 (identifying differences
among PTA methods).
242
See Crosby, supra note 229, at 157-58; Simon Joss, Participation in
Parliamentary Technology Assessment: From Theory to Practice, in PARLIAMENTS AND
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 80, at 325, 341.
243
See Peter C. Dienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A Gate to “Fractal”
Mediation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note 229,
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2. Constructive Technology Assessment
Unlike PTA and conventional TA, constructive
technology assessment (CTA) seeks to influence technology
design itself. Typically, innovation occurs within private
laboratories outside of public scrutiny,244 and regulation is
contemplated after a technology appears in commercial
applications.245 In contrast to this typical approach, CTA seeks
to promote interaction among stakeholders—technology
developers, regulators, workers, end users, and the potentially
affected public—during the technology development process.246
By facilitating incorporation of interested parties’ values into
the design process, such interaction can lead to more widely
accepted outcomes with fewer adverse effects.247 CTA may
involve public participation, but such participation serves as a
means of shaping technology and identifying risks rather than
as an end in and of itself.248
Advocates have identified three key features of CTA:
anticipation, reflexivity, and social learning.249 Anticipation of
potential technological interactions and adverse side effects
occurs through the involvement of a broad range of
stakeholders early in the design process and through “early

at 117, 121-24; Ortwin Renn et al., The Pursuit of Fair and Competent Citizen
Participation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note
229, at 339, 344.
244
SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 4; WESTRUM, supra note 79, at 107-27 (discussing
process of invention).
245
See COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 16-19 (explaining that control of a
technology is hampered at early stages by lack of knowledge about adverse
consequences and at later stages by diffusion and entrenchment of the technology); see
also Rip et al., supra note 217, at 2 (noting “two-track approach that separates
promotional activities from control and regulation”).
246
Johan Schot, Towards New Forms of Participatory Technology
Development, 13 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 39, 40-41 (2001). The terms
“interactive TA” and “real-time TA” refer to similar approaches. See David H. Guston &
Daniel Sarewitz, Real-Time Technology Assessment, 24 TECH. SOC’Y 93, 97-98 (2002)
(comparing real-time technology assessment with CTA); Rip, supra note 170, at 148.
Although governmental or semi-governmental bodies are the more likely practitioners
of CTA, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and other actors can perform and facilitate
CTA as well. See Johan Schot & Arie Rip, The Past and Future of Constructive
Technology Assessment, 54 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 251, 256 (1996).
247
Schot, supra note 246, at 40-42; Arne Remmen, Pollution Prevention,
Cleaner Technologies and Industry, in MANAGING TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY, supra note
217, at 199, 201 (stating that “constructive approach aims at integrating social and
environmental criteria right from the beginning”).
248
See Rip, supra note 170, at 147.
249
Schot, supra note 246, at 40.
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and controlled experimentation.”250 Because not all concerns can
be identified at the outset, however, the technology
development process should be flexible and iterative, allowing
for periodic reexamination of interactions and effects.251
Reflexivity refers to an appreciation of the various social effects
that different technology design options may have.252 Rather
than focusing narrowly on technical goals, technology
developers should take into account social, environmental, and
other consequences as they design and evaluate new
technologies. Finally, social learning refers to a mutual process
in which relevant actors learn from each other in the course of
technology development and use.253 Through social learning,
companies learn about consumer preferences and regulatory
requirements and can design products accordingly, and in
addition, existing preferences and requirements might be
shaped in favor of more sustainable technologies.254 Variants of
CTA may incorporate public opinion polling, content analysis,
and other tools to complement the basic CTA process.255
Denmark and the Netherlands have been at the
forefront of the development of PTA and CTA.256 In Denmark,
where the consensus conference was developed, the technique
has addressed topics such as the use of knowledge about the
human genome, irradiation of food, and genetically engineered
animals.257 These conferences produced recommendations that
were later incorporated into legislation and policy.258 In the
Netherlands, CTA techniques were applied to the creation and
design of novel, environmentally-friendly alternatives to meat.
250

Id. at 43; Guston & Sarewitz, supra note 246, at 97-98.
Remmen, supra note 247, at 201; Schot, supra note 246, at 43-44.
252
Erik Fisher et al., Midstream Modulation of Technology: Governance from
Within, 26 BULLETIN OF SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 485, 492 (2006); Schot, supra note 246, at
44. The concept is rooted in Ulrich Beck’s contention in Risk Society that a more
reflexive, self-critical approach must replace the traditional technocratic understanding
of science. See BECK, supra note 4, at 155-56.
253
Schot, supra note 246, at 44.
254
See id. at 44-45.
255
See Guston & Sarewitz, supra note 246, at 98; see also Sarewitz, supra note
127, at 4-5 (describing principles of real-time TA).
256
See Thomas Petermann, Technology Assessment Units in the European
Parliamentary Systems, in PARLIAMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 80, at 37, 49-50
(discussing the discursive and participatory function of TA in Denmark and the
Netherlands).
257
Lars Klüver, The Danish Board of Technology, in PARLIAMENTS AND
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 80, at 173, 190-91.
258
See id. For a practical evaluation of PTA efforts in Denmark, see Joss,
supra note 242, at 342-53.
251
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Meetings between various stakeholders generated agreement
on minimum standards for such products, and led technology
developers to devote more attention to issues of taste and
texture.259 More recently, the United States has begun to
experiment with a variant of CTA, real-time technology
assessment, in managing nanotechnology. This development is
considered below in more detail.260
3. Concerns
Commentators have raised a number of concerns
applicable to PTA and CTA. Notwithstanding such concerns,
these more recent forms of technology assessment offer
valuable options for society to manage new technologies more
effectively and democratically.
One obvious issue involves the interest and competence of
laypersons. The average citizen is likely to have limited
understanding of the technical matters that undergird modern
technologies.261 Laypersons may defer to experts or rely on
simplifying heuristics when assessing new technologies.262 Citizen
participation could cripple technology development if
unwarranted and irrational fears come to dominate the
assessment process.263 Furthermore, low levels of voter turnout
and other measures of civic engagement in general suggest that
laypersons may not take much interest in technology
assessment.264
If given the opportunity to participate in a meaningful
way, however, citizens have proven willing and competent to
engage in matters of public debate. Layperson interest is
suggested not only by anecdotal evidence, such as high levels of
participation in policy blogs, but also by studies finding an
259

See Schot, supra note 246, at 47-48.
See infra Part III.B.4.
261
See Fiorino, supra note 229, at 227 (“Given the sheer complexity of the
issues, the ‘transscientific’ nature of the factual premises, and the rapid changes in the
definition of problems and their solutions, the lay public lacks the time, information,
and inclination to take part in technically based problem solving.”).
262
See Matthew C. Nisbet & Dietram A. Scheufele, What’s Next for Science
Communication? Promising Directions and Lingering Distractions, 96 AM. J. BOTANY
1767, 1768 (2009) (remarking that the wider public tends to “rely on cognitive
shortcuts and heuristic decision making to help them reach opinions about policyrelated matters” involving science and technology).
263
See Leonhard Hennen, Impacts of Participatory TA on Its Societal
Environment, in KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 154.
264
See generally THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2002).
260
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eagerness to participate and resentment at exclusion.265 In
evaluating citizen competence, it is critical to keep in mind that
lay participation is primarily meant to provide a read on public
values, particularly with respect to public understandings of
risk, and not to replace technical expertise.266 Of course,
laypersons sometimes do identify technical issues, problems,
and contextual factors that experts have overlooked.267 But the
main question is whether laypersons can become sufficiently
informed on the technical issues such that they can apply their
personal experiences, belief systems, and values to new
technological situations of risk and uncertainty.268 PTA enables
informed participation by providing citizens with the time and
access to expertise required to learn about the issues.269 Citizens
participating in PTA exercises have served effectively as
“values consultants” and have not been too intimidated to
question experts, regulators, and stakeholders critically.270
Similarly, examples of citizen activism in technical
controversies demonstrate that laypersons can come to
sufficiently informed views, particularly if they develop
cooperative relationships with experts.271 This is not to say that
laypersons necessarily will agree with the experts or
policymakers after engaging on technology matters.
Ultimately, public opposition to the deployment of a new
technology often reflects not an inability to comprehend

265

See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 35-36; see also Michael X. Delli Carpini et
al., Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement, 7 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 315, 315-16, 323-24, 336 (2004) (reviewing studies of public deliberation).
266
See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 42 (“[S]cience is laden with social value
judgments, judgments typically hidden within the steps and phases of the research
process . . . .”); Nisbet & Scheufele, supra note 262, at 1768 (noting that values are far
more important determinants of public opinion about controversial areas of science
than knowledge); see also supra Part I.B.2.
267
ALAN IRWIN, CITIZEN SCIENCE: A STUDY OF PEOPLE, EXPERTISE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 172-73 (1995) (discussing citizens as a source of
information and expertise); Fiorino, supra note 229, at 227; see also FISCHER, supra
note 233, at 193-218 (discussing local knowledge that laypersons can contribute).
268
See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 132-42 (describing concept of cultural
rationality).
269
See Dienel & Renn, supra note 243, at 125; see also FISCHER, supra note
233, at 32 (contending that citizens “are much more capable of grappling with complex
problems than generally assumed”).
270
Nisbet & Scheufele, supra note 262, at 1770 (reporting that participants
not only learn about the technical, social, ethical, and economic aspects of the scientific
topic, but also become more confident and motivated to participate in science
decisions); Renn et al., supra note 243, at 345.
271
FISCHER, supra note 233, at 148-55 (discussing citizen activists’ efforts to
combat AIDS, identify cancer clusters, and engage in a nuclear power plant siting decision).
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scientific matters, but rather a distrust of the scientific and
government institutions that are invested in them.272
Another criticism of participatory approaches to TA
concerns the legitimacy of citizen participation.273 Lay
participants do not constitute democratic representatives of the
public will. In addition, because they need not answer to an
electorate, participants may endorse unrealistic or politically
infeasible policy options.274 PTA, however, does not replace
representative decision-making procedures. Rather, PTA serves
in a consultative role in support of decisions made by elected
representatives who are politically accountable.275 PTA thus
incorporates elements of direct participatory democracy, yet
remains rooted in a representative democratic system.276 The
method of selecting lay participants nevertheless does matter to
the credibility and utility of the process. While random selection
of participants does not ensure that citizen deliberations will be
representative, it can facilitate the expression of a wide range of
views, promote participants’ independence, and ameliorate
interest group efforts to rig the process.277
To the extent that PTA and CTA techniques tend to
emphasize the formation of consensus, they may mute the
expression of alternative viewpoints or dampen values conflicts
that are healthy for social risk management.278 Conversely,
achieving consensus may not be possible where value
differences are great, as is often the case with new
technologies.279 Indeed, one review of PTA efforts suggests that
PTA “increases the complexity of decision making by taking
into account different values to assess impacts of technology,
[and] by supplying all information and knowledge available
272

Brian Wynne, Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and
Ethics on GMOs, 10 SCI. AS CULTURE 445, 447, 475-76 (2001).
273
Armour, supra note 229, at 180; Hans-Jörg Seiler, Review of “Planning
Cells:” Problems of Legitimation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION, supra note 229, at 142-49.
274
See Dienel & Renn, supra note 243, at 129.
275
See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 171; Dienel & Renn, supra note 243,
at 129; Hörning, supra note 229, at 357.
276
See Joss, supra note 242, at 335-36.
277
KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 134; Hörning, supra note 229, at 357;
Renn et al., supra note 243, at 353. Notwithstanding random selection, certain
demographic groups, such as students and retirees, may be overrepresented on citizen
panels, just as they tend to be overrepresented on ordinary juries. See Dienel & Renn,
supra note 243, at 125.
278
See Audley Genus, Rethinking Constructive Technology Assessment as
Democratic, Reflective Discourse, 73 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 13, 19 (2006).
279
See Renn et al., supra note 243, at 353-54.
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and conveying uncertainties or deficiencies of knowledge.”280
Moreover, the time constraints inherent in some participatory
techniques may not allow adequate opportunity for the sort of
deep normative deliberation that democratic idealists might
desire.281 These concerns underscore the limitations of PTA and
CTA in reflecting the full range of public values and in
providing concrete solutions.282 Participatory approaches to TA
nonetheless can identify public concerns and provide a useful
roadmap for future research and analysis.283
The most serious objections to PTA and CTA involve the
relatively limited effect that such assessments may have on
actual decisions. Unless technology assessment efforts are
integrated into the policy-making process, those efforts may
prove to be little more than an academic exercise. Simply
providing the results of assessments to decisionmakers may not
overcome the domination of political decisions by vested
interests.284 Policymakers may be inclined to dismiss such
results as neither representative nor the product of expert
deliberation.285 And public participation may be of limited value
if experts control the framing of a problem and of policy
options.286 Rather than changing the relationship between
society and new technologies, TA might merely defuse
opposition by creating the appearance of an open, participatory
process.287 At the same time, powerful actors might escape
accountability for their role in promoting risky technologies.288

280

KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 155.
See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 238-39 (“Beyond merely uncovering
normative assumptions and beliefs, deliberation can lead to changes in assumptions, as
well as creations of new ones.”).
282
See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 155 (describing TA as a “contested
field of interests, preferences and values”).
283
See Arie Rip, Assessing the Impact of Innovation: New Developments in
Technology Assessment, in OECD PROCEEDINGS: SOCIAL SCIENCES AND INNOVATION
197, 197 (2001).
284
See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 154.
285
See Seiler, supra note 273, at 150.
286
Alan Irwin, Constructing the Scientific Citizen: Science and Democracy in the
Biosciences, 10 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 1, 12-13 (2001) (discussing an example in
which the institutional framing of public consultation constrained the role of the public).
287
Genus, supra note 278, at 21-23 (suggesting potential for TA to become a
“participation trap”); see also Wynne, supra note 107, at 463 (suggesting that efforts to
make science and technology more participatory “have perversely reinforced attention
only on back-end scientific questions about consequences” and thus “exclude[d] more
reflexive questions about the human purposes and visions which shape front-end
innovation commitments”).
288
See Genus, supra note 278, at 19.
281
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Indeed, the effect of citizen deliberations on
policymaking, while difficult to measure, generally appears
modest.289 Defenders of PTA attribute the limited policy impact of
PTA to its consultative nature; PTA is intended to inform rather
than to dictate policy decisions.290 Critics, however, contend that
PTA fails to bring about the multi-way communication between
lay citizens, stakeholders, and decision makers that is needed.291
Ensuring openness in the process and widespread dissemination
of results,292 while timing citizen deliberations so that their
output can be incorporated into an ongoing decision-making
process, can enhance PTA’s effectiveness.293 Likewise,
incorporating the results of CTA into actual technological
development has proven to be a daunting challenge.294
Technology developers are often reluctant to open up their
processes to outsider scrutiny, let alone outsider participation.
Absent a regulatory mandate, the effect of CTA activities may be
at best indirect, serving primarily as an external critique or
source of pressure on technology developers.295
4. Incipient U.S. PTA/CTA Efforts . . . and Beyond
Attempts to use modified TA techniques in the United
States during the 1980s and 1990s were limited in scope and
generally did not consider emerging technologies.296 More
recently, however, the growing field of nanotechnology has
become a testing ground for these methods.297 The 21st Century
289

Hörning, supra note 229, at 356.
KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 11.
291
See Armour, supra note 229, at 181.
292
Hörning, supra note 229, at 356. In the Netherlands, for example, PTA
organizers have sought to increase the influence of lay panels by raising their profile
and by facilitating communications between the panels and the general public via the
Internet. Rinie van Est, The Rathenau Institute’s Approach to Participatory TA, TADATABASE-NEWSL. (Institut für Technikfolgenabschätzung und Systemanalyse), Oct.
2000, at 13, 18, available at http://www.itas.fzk.de/deu/tadn/tadn003/vest00a.pdf.
293
KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 146. The desired timing may depend on
the function of PTA in a particular case: if the intent is to initiate debate or decide
whether to fund basic research, PTA should occur early in the process; if the intent is
to assess suitable applications of a controversial technology, PTA can be deferred, but
nonetheless should take place before irreversible commitments are made. Id. at 145-47.
294
Schot & Rip, supra note 246, at 255.
295
See id. at 255-56; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 6 (European industries have
“come to support [PTA] as a low-stress, low-cost mechanism for gauging societal
reactions to alternative research, development and innovation trajectories.”).
296
See Dienel & Renn, supra note 243, at 135-36 (describing use of planning
cells in the 1980s).
297
For a summary of U.S. PTA efforts, see SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 43-46.
290
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Nanotechnology
Research
and
Development
Act
(“Nanotechnology Act”) established a national nanotechnology
program whose mission includes “ensuring that ethical, legal,
environmental, and other appropriate societal concerns,
including the potential use of nanotechnology in enhancing
human intelligence and in developing artificial intelligence
which exceeds human capacity, are considered during the
development of nanotechnology.”298 The Nanotechnology Act
anticipates integration of public input in this process “through
mechanisms such as citizens’ panels, consensus conferences,
and educational events.”299
Per Congress’s direction in the Nanotechnology Act, the
National Science Foundation has funded the Centers for
Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (CNSASU) and the University of California, Santa Barbara to
identify and address social, ethical, and environmental
concerns.300 CNS-ASU is developing a “real-time technology
assessment” program incorporating CTA principles of
reflexivity and anticipatory governance.301 The program consists
of four main components: (1) characterizing nanotechnology
research; (2) monitoring opinion and values among researchers
and the public regarding nanotechnology; (3) involving
researchers and the public in deliberation and shared
participation; and (4) assessing the program’s effects on
nanotechnology researchers and on nanotechnology in society.302
Efforts to
integrate modified TA techniques into
nanotechnology development pursuant to the Act represent a
promising departure from the past, and these efforts are still in
298

15 U.S.C. § 7501(b)(10) (2006).
Id. § 7501(b)(10)(D).
300
The discussion here focuses on CNS-ASU’s more extensive efforts in the
area of real-time technology assessment. For a description of research activities at
CNS-UCSB, see Research, CNS-UCSB, http://www.cns.ucsb.edu/research (last visited
Jan. 20, 2011); see also Nick Pidgeon et al., Deliberating the Risks of Nanotechnologies
for Energy and Health Applications in the United States and United Kingdom, 4
NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 95 (2009) (discussing results of public workshops on energy
and health nanotechnologies held at Santa Barbara and in the United Kingdom).
301
See David H. Guston, The Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona
State University and the Prospects for Anticipatory Governance, in NANOSCALE: ISSUES
AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE NANO CENTURY 377, 380 (Nigel M. de S. Cameron & M.
Ellen Mitchell eds., 2007); see also Daniel Barben et al., Anticipatory Governance of
Nanotechnology: Foresight, Engagement & Integration, in THE HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (Edward J. Hackett et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008).
302
See Guston, supra note 301, at 382-84; see also Center for Nanotechnology
in Society at Arizona State University, CNS-ASU, http://cns.asu.edu/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2011).
299
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progress. But for the reasons discussed below, they fall short in
generating the upfront assessment and widespread public
participation needed.
For example, an important part of CNS-ASU’s efforts to
engage the public was the organization of a “National Citizens’
Technology Forum” (NCTF) linking six groups of citizens from
different parts of the United States.303 The forum, held in 2008,
did not deliberate on nanotechnology in general, but instead
focused on the specific topic of human enhancement through
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technologies, and
cognitive science.304 Following face-to-face and electronic
deliberative sessions, each group of citizens drafted a report
that represented the consensus of the group.305 The organizers
of the forum concluded that citizens are supportive of research
on these transformational technologies if coupled with
trustworthy oversight, and that “average citizens want to be
involved in the technological decisions that might end up
shaping their lives.”306
The results of the NCTF do suggest that citizens have
the desire and ability to participate in decisions about
technology development. In addition, the citizens’ reports
reflect a slice of public opinion reached after substantial
deliberation. Nonetheless, the ultimate impact of the NCTF on
actual nanotechnology development and policy appears
minimal. Simply publishing citizens’ reports hardly ensures
any influence on the course of research or on nanotechnology
regulation.307 The reports have no clear constituency or
audience, and efforts to diffuse them have been limited.308
303

HAMLETT ET AL., supra note 60. A similar citizens’ jury met in the United
Kingdom in 2005 to consider nanotechnology. That group made recommendations on
the use of nanotechnology in health care and renewable energy, and called for labeling,
safety testing, and greater public involvement in the direction of research. See James
Wilsdon, Paddling Upstream: New Currents in European Technology Assessment, in
RODEMEYER ET AL., supra note 103.
304
HAMLETT ET AL., supra note 60, at 1; Brice Laurent, Replicating
Participatory Devices: The Consensus Conference Confronts Nanotechnology 5 (Centre
de Sociologie de l’Innovation Working Paper No. 018, 2009).
305
HAMLETT ET AL., supra note 60, at 1.
306
Id. at 2.
307
Cf. Maria Powell & Daniel Lee Kleinman, Building Citizen Capacities for
Participation in Nanotechnology Decision-Making: The Democratic Virtues of the
Consensus Conference Model, 17 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 329, 341, 344 (2008)
(reporting that several participants in 2005 Wisconsin nanotechnology consensus
conference expressed view that neither scientists nor government would be responsive
to their concerns and that the conference would not influence policy).
308
See Laurent, supra note 304, at 12; see also Ira Bennett & Daniel Sarewitz,
Too Little, Too Late?: Research Policies on the Societal Implications of Nanotechnology
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Indeed, one commentator characterized the NCTF primarily
“as a social scientific research instrument.”309 The main purpose
of the NCTF, in other words, was to demonstrate the value of
deliberation and to investigate ways of structuring consensus
conferences to foster high-quality deliberation.310 Apparently,
the objective of influencing technology development or
technology policy was of far less importance. Furthermore,
although participants in the NCTF undoubtedly learned about
and became engaged in the issues, the public at large was not
brought into the process and generally remains uninformed
about nanotechnology.311
There are a number of other shortcomings in technology
assessment efforts under the Nanotechnology Act. First, the
magnitude of those efforts is dwarfed by the magnitude of
efforts to develop and implement nanotechnology. Only about
5% of federal nanotechnology funding—authorized for a total of
approximately $3.7 billion from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year
2008312—falls under the rubric of research on health and
environmental effects. That general category includes a wide
range of projects such as the use of nanotechnology to
remediate environmental pollution; only about one-third of that
five percent figure supports research aimed at addressing
nanotechnology’s hazards.313 Given this funding imbalance and
the diversity of nanomaterials to be studied, identifying health
in the United States, 15 SCI. AS CULTURE 309, 319 (2006) (noting that the 21st Century
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act does not specify “the processes by
which research results are to enhance decision making”).
309
Laurent, supra note 304, at 11. One researcher involved in the NCTF
observed that participants “knew that they were part of a research project” and
consequently “tended to not even bother to fight for ideas or opinion[s].” Id. at 25
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
310
Id. at 10-11.
311
HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., NANOTECHNOLOGY, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY &
PUBLIC OPINION 1 (2009), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/
files/8286/nano_synbio.pdf (reporting that “nearly 7 in 10 [Americans] (68%) have
heard just a little or nothing about [nanotechnology]”); Guston, supra note 301, at 389
(noting that polls reflect modest public knowledge of and engagement in
nanotechnology); see also Elizabeth A. Corley & Dietram A. Scheufele, Outreach Gone
Wrong?, SCIENTIST, Jan. 2010, at 22 (finding “widening gaps in nanotech knowledge
between the least educated and the most educated citizens”). Broadening public
awareness of and engagement in nanotechnology is left to the Nanoscale Informal
Science Education Network (NISE Net), which promotes nanotechnology education
through science museums. See Guston, supra note 301, at 379, 389; NANOSCALE
INFORMAL SCI. EDUC. NETWORK, http://www.nisenet.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
312
15 U.S.C. § 7505 (2006).
313
J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
NANOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 7 (2008),
available at http://nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/6709/pen13.pdf.
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and environmental concerns and integrating them into the
technology development process is a daunting challenge.
Nanotechnology development essentially “got a 15 year head
start”314 on technology assessment efforts, with the number of
nanotechnology-based consumer products currently on the
market exceeding one thousand.315 Although nanotechnology
products are becoming increasingly common, quantitative and
validated risk assessment data for nanotechnology remains
generally unavailable, and will continue to be unavailable for
some time.316
Moreover, as CNS-ASU Director David Guston has
observed, overall nanotechnology research “has grown much
larger and faster than the societal implications work that
might engage it.”317 Whether the TA efforts sponsored by the
Nanotechnology Act will affect the overall course of
nanotechnology research and development is uncertain.318 CNSASU’s efforts to encourage nanotechnology researchers to be
more reflexive about their research have influenced research
focus and design in some individual instances, but such
influence has been limited largely to graduate student
researchers on the ASU campus.319 Similarly, the role of the
NCTF and other technology assessment activities within the
broader context of nanotechnology research is somewhat
unclear. As other commentators have explained, the
Nanotechnology Act contains an inherent tension between the
goal of promoting rapid nanotechnology development and
314

Bennett & Sarewitz, supra note 308, at 322.
Analysis, PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, http://www.
nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/analysis_draft (last visited Jan. 19, 2011)
(“As of August 25, 2009, the nanotechnology consumer products inventory contains
1015 products or product lines.”).
316
See Elizabeth A. Corley et al., Of Risks and Regulations: How Leading U.S.
Nanoscientists Form Policy Stances About Nanotechnology, 11 J. NANOPARTICLE RES.
1573, 1574 (2009).
317
Guston, supra note 301, at 389 (noting that “a $1 billion/per year NNI in the
United States overwhelms the $3-million/year nanotechnology-in-society network”); see also
Guston & Sarewitz, supra note 246, at 106 (noting that widespread nano-scale science and
engineering activity “is already too large and diverse to be the subject of a single TA effort”).
318
Cf. Monika Kurath & Priska Gisler, Informing, Involving or Engaging?
Science Communication, in the Ages of Atom-, Bio-, and Nanotechnology, 18 PUB.
UNDERSTANDING SCI. 559, 568 (2009) (contending that public outreach efforts in
Europe with respect to nanotechnology have occurred after major investment decisions
were already made and “tend to limit public engagement to matters of values and
social and ethical aspects, rather than to expose expertise to scrutiny”).
319
See Guston, supra note 301, at 384-85; Interview with Jameson Wetmore, Ass’t
Professor, Ariz. State Univ., in Pacific Grove, CA (Mar. 24, 2010). Efforts to export such
activities to other universities have begun. Interview with Jameson Wetmore, supra.
315
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implementation and the goal of integrating societal concerns
into the research and development process.320 The risk remains
that technology assessment efforts with respect to
nanotechnology may serve as little more than a political tool for
obtaining public acceptance.321
Thus, notwithstanding some progress in addressing the
concerns raised at the outset of this article,322 questions persist
regarding how to promote a broader and more thorough
analysis of a technology’s consequences, how to engage the
general public in emerging technology issues, and how to
interject public values more forcefully into the technology
decision-making process.
A recent proposal for facilitating expert assessment and
citizen participation involves the establishment of an “Expert
& Citizen Assessment of Science & Technology Network”
comprised of universities, science museums, policy institutions,
and nonprofit organizations.323 Such a network would not
require legislative approval or appropriation and could act
flexibly in selecting, framing, and analyzing topics for
assessment.324 It is vital, however, that the network’s processes
and analyses be well-executed, insightful, and nonpartisan in
order to establish credibility with policymakers and the public.
One means of linking PTA more immediately to
policymaking would be to involve elected officials and other
policymakers directly in the technology assessment process.
During the 1980s, several citizens’ juries were convened in the
United States on an experimental basis.325 In an effort to
320

E.g., Erik Fisher & Roop L. Mahajan, Contradictory Intent? US Federal
Legislation on Integrating Societal Concerns into Nanotechnology Research and
Development, 33 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y, Feb. 2006, at 5, 10-14 (comparing 15 U.S.C.
§ 7501(b)(1)-(9) (2006) with § 7501(b)(10)).
321
See Mette Ebbesen, The Role of The Humanities and Social Sciences in
Nanotechnology Research and Development, 2 NANOETHICS 1, 2-3 (2008); see also
Fisher & Mahajan, supra note 320, at 13 (“Depending on how it is implemented, the
Act could emerge as a shrewd piece of legislative rhetoric, reducing societal research
and related activities to a sideshow in order to push rapid nanotechnology development
past a potentially wary public, or as a tool for ushering in a prudent new paradigm in
technology development . . . .”); Tee Rogers-Hayden & Nick Pidgeon, Moving
Engagement “Upstream”? Nanotechnologies and the Royal Society and Royal Academy
of Engineering’s Inquiry, 16 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 345, 345 (2007) (discussing
danger that public engagement on nanotechnology in the United Kingdom “may well,
intentionally or unintentionally, serve only token purposes”).
322
See Part I.B.
323
See SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 38-41.
324
Id. at 38-39.
325
According to one organizer, legislators viewed these efforts “as a bother at
best and, at worst, as a real challenge to the way business is currently conducted.”
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overcome the political and cultural resistance to these forms of
public participation, organizers convinced two congressional
representatives to participate in portions of citizens’ jury
hearings.326 Widespread legislator participation in PTA is
unlikely, however, given the numerous demands on legislators’
time and the limited payoff for legislators who do participate.
A more realistic approach would have politicians raise
the profile of emerging technology issues for the purpose of
stimulating public debate. A prominent example of this
approach involves federal funding of research on stem cells
derived from human embryos. In 2001, President George W.
Bush issued a statement limiting such funding after personally
deliberating on the issue in a very public way.327 Of interest
here is not the substance of that decision, which was criticized
on a number of grounds328 and later reversed by President
Obama,329 but rather the process leading up to it. Although that
controversy involved primarily ethical concerns, the public
discussions surrounding the issue demonstrate how public
deliberation on technology matters can identify important
societal values at stake.330 President Bush’s high-profile
consideration of the issue appropriately expanded to the
general public a debate that had been previously limited to a
“small, professionally invested elite.”331 Government support for
efforts to communicate emerging technology issues broadly through
cable channels such as the Discovery Channel, local media outlets,
and creative media would similarly foster public engagement.332
Nonbinding national technology referendums are
another promising mechanism to increase public involvement
and input. Potential subjects of such referendums could be
identified by Congress, the president, or the CEQ. Ideally, such
Crosby, supra note 229, at 159; see also id. at 167 (noting “cultural discrepancy”
between citizens’ jury process and “normal political procedure”).
326
Id.
327
Press Release, White House Office of Commc’ns, Remarks by the President
on Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), 2001 WL 896981.
328
E.g., Russell Korobkin, Embryonic Histrionics: A Critical Evaluation of the
Bush Stem Cell Funding Policy and the Congressional Alternative, 47 JURIMETRICS 1 (2006).
329
Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 11, 2009).
330
See Richard Lacayo, How Bush Got There, TIME, Aug. 20, 2001, at 17 (discussing
President Bush’s consultations on the subject and accompanying political debate).
331
Paul Root Wolpe & Glenn McGee, “Expert Bioethics” as Professional
Discourse: The Case of Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE 185,
186 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001); see also Gretchen Vogel, Rumors and Trial
Balloons Precede Bush’s Funding Decision, 293 SCIENCE 186 (2001).
332
Nisbet & Scheufele, supra note 262, at 1774-75.
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referendums would take place on a periodic basis after citizens’
juries or similar panels have already met to consider an
emerging technology. An appointed panel of experts, social
scientists, and citizens would develop a limited number of
questions, each having several possible responses, to be set
forth in the referendums.333 The purpose of such referendums
would be to supplement, rather than to replace representative
decision making.334 A technology referendum would bring the
broader public into discussions about technology and would
provide an opportunity for a societal-level debate.335 Such
debate could take into account the in-depth considerations and
recommendations of citizens’ juries, which would help to
counter the effects of any superficial media campaigns that
would likely arise.336 Through technology referendums, the
public would gain a direct voice in critical developments that
shape their lives.337
Of course, referendums are an imperfect tool for
gauging public sentiment or promoting public deliberation.
Like voters in general, referendum voters tend to be older,
wealthier, and more educated than the average person.338 The
333

Presenting several options would generate more information about voter
preferences while encouraging voters to think as public citizens. See BENJAMIN R.
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 286-88 (2003).
334
See David Butler & Austin Ranney, Theory, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE
WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 11, 13-16 (David Butler & Austin
Ranney eds., 1994) (discussing benefits from supplementing representative institutions
with referendums); Maija Setälä, On the Problems of Responsibility and Accountability
in Referendums, 45 EUR. J. POL. RES. 699, 701-02 (2006). The potential for a
referendum to undermine representative institutions, see Butler & Ranney, supra, at
20, is reduced by making the referendums nonbinding. The use of a nonbinding
procedure at the national level has the additional advantage of requiring only
congressional authorization, rather than constitutional amendment.
335
Bruno S. Frey, Efficiency and Democratic Political Organisation; The Case
for the Referendum, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 209, 219 (1992) (contending that the public
discussion induced by referenda “shapes the citizens’ preferences” by confronting them
with issues they have not previously considered and by encouraging them to evaluate
those issues according to their basic values).
336
See BARBER, supra note 333, at 267-98 (recommending that participatory
institutions include mechanisms for improving people’s competence to make reasonable
political judgments); Setälä, supra note 334, at 702-03 (discussing deliberative
democratic rationale for the referendum and initiative).
337
BARBER, supra note 333, at 284 (“In sum, the initiative and referendum
can increase popular participation in and responsibility for government, provide a
permanent instrument of civic education, and give popular talk the reality and
discipline of power that it needs to be effective.”); see also THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 78-79 (1989)
(discussing surveys finding that citizens generally are in favor of having a direct vote
with respect to important issues and policies).
338
See Butler & Ranney, supra note 334, at 18; CRONIN, supra note 337, at 76-77.
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results of a nonbinding referendum could be viewed as
analogous to the results of a national public opinion poll.339 And
questions must be framed with care to ensure their
comprehensibility and neutrality. But nonbinding referendums
could bring needed attention to emerging technology issues and
prove far more effective than polls in engaging and educating
the public.340 A nonbinding referendum would essentially open
up the public hearing phase of legislation to the country, while
leaving the lawmaking details and final exercise of policy
judgments to Congress.341 Moreover, as an empirical matter,
representative bodies often do follow the results of nonbinding
referendums, a fact that suggests their persuasive effect on
elected officials is tangible.342 Carrying out such referendums in
conjunction with each presidential election would promote
relatively high turnout and public interest and limit the
potential for strategic timing of referendums.343
The most powerful tools for bringing about effective and
open technology assessment would involve stronger incentives
for technology developers to consider public concerns, including
health and environmental risks. First, technology assessment
and public involvement should be included as criteria for
awarding research grants. The National Science Foundation
(NSF), for example, considers both the “intellectual merit” and
the “broader impacts” of proposed research in reviewing
research grant proposals.344 Under the “broader impacts
339

See CRONIN, supra note 337, at 179.
See David Butler & Austin Ranney, Theory, in REFERENDUMS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 23, 30 (David Butler & Austin Ranney
eds., 1978) (explaining how referendums can bring policymaking and political decisions
psychologically closer to the people); CRONIN, supra note 337, at 87-89 (noting need for
ingenuity in efforts to interest and inform voters, while concluding that “[v]oters who
do vote on ballot measures do so more responsibly and intelligently than we have any
right to expect”); see also MAIJA SETÄLÄ, REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT: NORMATIVE THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS 165 (1999)
(suggesting that “referendums offer the increasing number of citizens outside party
organisations and without strong party identification an opportunity to participate in
decision-making without the mediation of the parties”).
341
See CRONIN, supra note 337, at 178.
342
See Setälä, supra note 334, at 713-14.
343
Where candidate choices and referendum propositions are on the same
ballot, there is on average a fifteen percentage point drop-off in the proportion of voters
casting ballots on the latter as compared with the former. See Butler & Ranney, supra
note 334, at 16. However, propositions involving controversial or highly visible issues
may attract higher levels of voting. CRONIN, supra note 337, at 67-69.
344
Robert Frodeman & Jonathan Parker, Intellectual Merit and Broader
Impact: The National Science Foundation’s Broader Impacts Criterion and the Question
of Peer Review, 23 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 337, 339 (2009). The federal government funds over
one-quarter of research and development expenditures in the United States. Mark Boroush,
340
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criterion” (BIC), the NSF considers whether a proposal would
“promot[e] teaching, training and learning,” “broaden the
participation of underrepresented groups,” “enhance the
infrastructure for research and education,” enhance scientific
understanding, and provide benefits to society.345 In theory, the
BIC could be a means of evaluating a research proposal’s
incorporation of public participation and the social and
environmental implications of such research. But application of
the BIC has run into deep-rooted resistance among researchers
and reviewers in the scientific community.346 In practice, the
BIC is often treated as a relatively unimportant criterion that
can be fulfilled merely by hiring educational professionals to
disseminate information to the general public.347 Such a limited
conception of the BIC not only fails to encourage scientists to
involve the public in the process of technology research and
development; it also fails to transform how the scientists think
about their research and its broader societal implications.348
Including social scientists on proposal review panels would be
one way of facilitating an expanded understanding of the BIC
and ensuring that it plays a role in government research
funding decisions.349 Another way to make the BIC more
effective and to encourage reflexivity within the scientific
community would be for NSF to amend its grant proposal

New NSF Estimates Indicate that U.S. R&D Spending Continued to Grow in 2008,
INFOBRIEF, Jan. 2010, available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf10312; see also
Corley et al., supra note 316, at 1577 (discussing survey finding that nanotechnology
researchers rely heavily on government grants).
345
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., OMB CONTROL NO. 3145-0058, PROPOSAL AND AWARD
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GUIDE pt. I, ch. II, at 8 (2009); NAT’L SCI. FOUND., MERIT
REVIEW BROADER IMPACTS CRITERION: REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVITIES (2007), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/gpg/broaderimpacts.pdf.
346
Holbrook, supra note 165, at 437-48 (describing difficulties encountered in
applying BIC and suggesting that difficulties reflect basic philosophical differences
regarding the relevance of broader social considerations to “pure” scientific research).
347
Frodeman & Parker, supra note 344, at 340-41 (“BIC is not simply an
education and public outreach . . . criterion—but it generally gets (mis)interpreted in
this way.”); Robert Frodeman & J. Britt Holbrook, Science’s Social Effects, ISSUES SCI.
& TECH., Spring 2007, at 28, 28.
348
Frodeman & Holbrook, supra note 347, at 28 (observing that such an
approach to BIC “emphasize[s] a triumphalist view” of science and technology and that
it “does not reflect on the larger moral, political, and policy implications of the advance
of scientific knowledge and technological capabilities”).
349
Id. at 30; see also Frodeman & Parker, supra note 344, at 342 (advocating
interaction between scientists and researchers on science, technology, and society at all
stages of research).
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guidance to explicitly state the importance of consulting with
the public and considering a broader range of impacts.350
Finally, it is essential to put incentives in place to hold
technology developers responsible for the adverse health and
environmental effects of their products. An important step
towards this goal would be to require greater disclosure to
increase social awareness of emerging technologies and their
uses. Labeling foods that contain GMOs or products that
incorporate nanotechnology can enable more informed
consumer choices, increase general public awareness of new
technologies, and reduce barriers to holding manufacturers
legally responsible for adverse consequences caused by their
products.351 Additional measures will likely be necessary,
however, to create stronger incentives further upstream in the
technology development process. One such measure could
impose liability under tort law for “foreseeably unforeseeable”
consequences of new technologies.352 Or, as I have contended
elsewhere with respect to products containing nanomaterials,
environmental assurance bonding can be a suitable policy tool
to address situations where health and environmental risks are
substantially uncertain.353 Requiring companies that introduce
new technologies in such circumstances to post bonds helps to
assure “the existence of funds to pay for damages that are
subsequently discovered,” without blocking new technologies
from entering the market.354 Bonding requirements also give
companies an economic incentive to undertake research to
demonstrate that their products are safe.355 The prospect of
reducing or releasing the bond would prompt companies to
support technology assessment more actively—by conducting
assessments themselves or by facilitating government or
independent
third-party
assessments.
Environmental
assurance bonding ultimately offers, as Doug Kysar has
argued, a “pragmatic combination of respect for the power of

350

Cf. Rip, supra note 170, at 150-55 (recommending interactions between
different types of actors in order to increase reflexivity in development of
nanotechnology).
351
Lin, supra note 52, at 393-94.
352
See Owen, supra note 2, at 609-10 (suggesting that such liability should be
limited “to situations where industry has recklessly let loose untested new technology
with frightening potential consequences”).
353
Lin, supra note 52, at 397-404.
354
Id. at 398-99.
355
Id.
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markets and human technology, and caution before the
complexities of nature.”356
CONCLUSION
Transforming our approach to emerging technologies to
integrate more thorough assessment and greater public
participation into the ongoing process of technology
management will not be easy. By their very nature, emerging
technologies often defy prediction regarding their developmental
paths, applications, and adverse consequences. Furthermore, the
approach advocated here runs counter to cultural norms that
celebrate innovation, scientific paradigms that emphasize
freedom of inquiry and expert peer review, and political
discourse that demands scientific certainty as a prerequisite for
regulatory oversight. Yet to continue with our current approach
would be narrow, shortsighted, and unrepresentative. At the
very least, the government can take modest steps towards
taking technology assessment seriously by reconstituting the
OTA and revisiting NEPA’s potential as a tool for meaningful
planning and participation in technology matters. Transforming
our relationships with emerging technologies, however, will
require more radical mechanisms to incorporate citizen
participation and to compel thoughtful and responsible
technology development. Ultimately, citizens must take an
active role in the management of emerging technologies by
informing themselves on the issues, participating in assessment
and management processes, and demanding that their
representatives exercise effective oversight.
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Douglas A. Kysar, Ecologic: Nanotechnology, Environmental Assurance
Bonding, and Symmetric Humility, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 201, 208-09 (2010).

